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REGULATING EVOLUTION FOR SALE: AN
EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY MODEL FOR REGULATING
THE UNNATURAL SELECTION OF GENETICALLY
MODIFIED ORGANISMS
Mary Jane Angelo*

"Popular accounts of evolution are rife with references
to 'progress,' from 'primitive' to more 'advanced' beings,
as if describing the evolution of airplanes from the
Wright brothers to the Concorde jet. The difference is
that there is no Wright brothers in biological
evolution."'
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

II.
III.

INTRODUCTION-THE WRIGHT BROTHERS APPEAR ...................... 94
UNNATURAL SELECTION AND THE CASE OF THE
"POPCORN SHRIMP" ..................................................................... 98
THE RISKS OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS .................... 102

A.
B.
C.

IV.

Traditional Risks: GMOs as Chemicals ............................... 103
Novel Risks: GMOs as "Darwin in Hyperspeed" ............. 106
Economic Risks: Contamination of Organic Crops
and Pesticide Resistance .......................................................
108
D. Uncertain Risks: New Technology and Lack of
E xperience ..............................................................................
110
U .S. REGULATION OF GM Os ..........................................................
112
A. History (CoordinatedFramework)........................................ 112
B. Environmental Protection Agency Authority ...................... 114
1. Microbial GM Pesticides Under FIFRA ......................... 119
2. GM Plant-Incorporated Protectants Under FIFRA ....... 123
3. GM Pesticides in Food Under FFDCA ............................ 128
4. Non-Pesticidal GMOs Under TSCA ................................ 129
C. Food and Drug Administration Authority ........................... 131

* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law.
I would like to thank Alyson C. Flournoy and Michael A. Wolf for their helpful
comments and encouragement, Brenda Appledorn and Kevin Shuler for
excellent research assistance, and the University of Florida Summer Research
Grant Program for financial assistance.
1. Philip Johansson, Crucibles of Evolution, EARTHWATCH INST. J., Aug.
2001, at 5, 13.

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

D.
V.
VI.
VII.

U.S. Department of Agriculture Authority ........................... 134
1. GMOs Under the Plant Protection Act ........................... 134
2. Non-Indigenous Organisms Under the PPA ................... 138
THE NEED FOR A REEVALUATION ................................................... 141
EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY ................................................................ 148
A. Evolutionary Biology Theory .................................................
150
B . Law and B iology .....................................................................
152
AN EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY MODEL FOR REGULATING GMOS ..... 156

A.
B.

General Considerations .........................................................
Looking Before You Leap and the Precautionary
Prin ciple ..................................................................................
C. Addressing Traditional Risks, Novel Risks,
Economic Risks, and Uncertain
Risks: A
Decisionm aking Framework ..................................................
V III. C ON CLUSION ...................................................................................
I.

156
159
161
165

INTRODUCTION-THE WRIGHT BROTHERS APPEAR

In the past ten years, there has been an explosion in the genetic
manipulation of living organisms to create commercial products.
This genetic manipulation has, in effect, been a directed change in
the evolutionary process for the purpose of profit.2 In essence, the
commercialization of genetic engineering has added the "Wright
brothers" into the equation of natural selection and evolution, thus
directing the path and pace of evolution. This deliberate alteration
of the path of evolution has brought with it a panoply of novel
environmental, human health, and economic risks that could not
have been foreseen when U.S. environmental and health protection
laws evolved. What once took evolution centuries to accomplish can
now be done in what seems an instant, prompting one commentator
to refer to genetic engineering as "Darwin in hyperspeed."4 Not only
has genetic engineering dramatically accelerated evolution, but it
2. Genetically modified plant crops have been planted commercially in the
United States since 1994. By 2002, more than 88 million acres of genetic
engineering-derived crops were being planted annually in the United States.
Proposed Federal Actions to Update Field Test Requirements for Biotechnology
Derived Plants, 67 Fed. Reg. 50,578, 50,578 (Aug. 2, 2002).
3. Throughout this Article, the term "genetic engineering" and "genetic
modification" will be used interchangeably and will be used consistently
with the U.S. Department of Agriculture ("USDA") definition, which states:
"Genetic engineering refers to the process in which one or more genes and other
genetic elements from one or more organism(s) are inserted into the genetic
material of a second organism using recombinant DNA techniques." USDA,
APHIS BIOTECHNOLOGY:
(2006), http://aphis.usda.gov/
publications/biotechnology/content/printable-version/BRSFS-permitprogress_
ANIMAL

AND

PERMITTING

PLANT

PROGRESS

HEALTH
INTO

INSPECTION

SERV.,

TOMORROW

1

02-06.pdf [hereinafter APHIS BIOTECHNOLOGY].
4. Charles A. Deacon & Emilie K. Paterson, Emerging Trends in
Biotechnology Litigation, 20 REV. LITIG. 589, 590 (2001).
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also has accomplished things that probably never would have been
accomplished through natural evolution, regardless of the passage of
time. Through genetic engineering, DNA can be moved across all
biological barriers, even at the kingdom level (i.e., between
microorganisms, plants, and animals). This dramatic jumping of
biological barriers does not occur in nature or through conventional
breeding practices.
Many products have been modified by genetic engineering to
possess traits that increase their ability to reproduce and survive in
the environment.
Such traits include insect resistance, viral
infection resistance, drought tolerance, and temperature tolerance
in crop plants. By genetically manipulating microorganisms, plants,
and animals to make them more "fit" from an evolutionary
standpoint, science has altered the path of evolution to favor not
those organisms that have evolved to be more fit for their natural
environment, but instead those organisms that have become more fit
at the hand of humans for commercialization and profit-making.
U.S. environmental law has not evolved to keep pace with these
dramatic changes in the evolution of our biological systems. Thus,
completely new approaches are needed to address these novel6
issues. U.S. regulation of genetically modified organisms ("GMOs")

has occurred in a reactionary, haphazard fashion and has been
fraught with political controversy and bureaucratic inertia.
Moreover, regulatory agencies have been artificially constrained by
early U.S. policy on genetic engineering to rely on existing statutory
authorities and to regulate based on the "products" of genetic
engineering rather than the "process" by which they are created.
Reliance on a mishmash of statutory authorities that predate the
advent of genetic engineering and the ensuing interagency turf
battles and differing approaches to regulating similar products
among different agencies with different missions has resulted in
profound regulatory gaps, overlaps, and inconsistencies. With more
than 88 million acres of genetic engineering-derived crops being
planted annually in the United States, more than 130 million acres
worldwide, 7 and new and different genetically modified ("GM") crops
5.

John Charles Kunich, Mother Frankenstein, Doctor Nature, and the

Environmental Law of Genetic Engineering, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 807, 812 (2001).

Conventional plant or animal breeding techniques typically involve crossfertilization or cross-breeding between varieties or breeds of the same species,
and rarely, between species in the'same genus. Id.
6. The term genetically modified organism, or "GMO," is commonly used
to refer to organisms that are the product of genetic engineering. For a
definition of "genetic engineering," see supra note 3. Throughout this Article,
"GM" will refer to "genetically modified."
7. Proposed Federal Action to Update Field Test Requirements for
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continually being developed, the time has come for a serious
reevaluation of the U.S. approach to regulating GMOs.
GMOs are typically portrayed as either a panacea, at one end of
the spectrum, or the stuff of science fiction horror movies, at the
other extreme. However, the truth, as with most truths, probably
falls somewhere in the middle. While GMOs hold the promise of
important advances in agriculture, medicine, and industry, they are
not without risk. Further, the elements of risk associated with
GMOs are frequently different in kind and degree than the risks
regulatory programs.
typically addressed by environmental
Although legal scholars, such as Thomas 0. McGarity,' have
analyzed U.S. laws addressing certain elements of risk posed by
GMOs, this Article is the first to analyze the complete array of U.S.
regulatory programs addressing GMOs and the adequacy of these
programs to address the novel elements of risk posed by GMOs.
Moreover, this Article is the first to propose a new approach to
regulation of GMOs utilizing principles drawn from evolutionary
biology theory.
The thesis of this Article is that a new legal approach, which
draws on principles of evolutionary biology, is needed to address the
novel risks of environmental harm caused by man's intervention in
and manipulation of evolution through the development of GMOs.
While most environmental laws have been adopted as a reaction to a
particular environmental catastrophe or crisis, 9 this Article asserts
Biotechnology Derived Plants, 67 Fed. Reg. at 50,578. The Office of Science and
Technology Policy states that while the increases in GM crops are most
dramatic in the United States, other nations, such as Canada, Argentina, and
China, are also experiencing significant growth in the development and use of
GM crops. Id. "In 2004, 40 percent of the corn, 81 percent of the soybeans, and
73 percent of the cotton grown in the United States were genetically
engineered." APHIS BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 3, at 1. For a complete list of
all GMOs that have been approved to be released in the United States, see
United States Regulatory Agencies Unified Biotechnology Website,
http://usbiotechreg.nbii.gov (follow "Database" hyperlink; then follow "All
Products" hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 28, 2006).
8. See infra notes 241-42 and accompanying text.
9. See Michael Allan Wolf, Essay, Environmental Law Slogans for the New
Millennium, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 91, 99 (2001) ("Disasters breed environmental
law. One can easily trace the origins of several federal statutory schemes to
specific ecological calamities. While it would be an exaggeration to isolate one
incident and identify it as the sole cause for a statute, we can legitimately ask
whether the United States Code would have contained the Air Pollution Control
Act of 1955 without the Donora, Pennsylvania disaster and Los Angeles's
poisonous smog; the Coastal Zone Management Act without the Santa Barbara
oil spill; the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 without the Exxon Valdez debacle; or the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA) without Love Canal.") (footnotes omitted); see also Bradley C.
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that the law should not wait for a GMO catastrophe. This Article
builds on the work of leading experts in the science of evolutionary
biology, such as Edward 0. Wilson'" and Richard Dawkins," and the
work of legal scholars, such as William H. Rodgers,'2 Owen Jones,"
and E. Donald Elliot,1 4 who have applied evolutionary biology
principles to the law. It should be noted that while this Article
focuses on a new approach to regulating GMOs, the proposed
approach may be equally applicable for the regulation of other living
organisms, such as non-indigenous organisms and new types of
artificially cultivated organisms like farmed fish and endangered
species bred to repopulate or increase populations in existing
environments. Part II of this Article sets forth a fact pattern that
illustrates the state of GMOs and highlights the novel elements of
risk and amplification of risk that these organisms pose. These
novel elements of risk are referred to throughout the Article to
illustrate points raised by the Article. Part III describes the types of
risks associated with GMOs and identifies how these risks are the
same as or similar to other environmental risks and how risks
associated with GMOs are novel. Part IV describes the existing
regulatory programs governing GMOs administered by the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), the Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA"), and the U.S. Department of Agriculture
("USDA"). It demonstrates that these programs have failed to
adequately address certain types of risks associated with some
GMOs. Part V sets forth the argument that there is a need for a
serious reevaluation of U.S. GMO policy and regulation. 15 Part VI

Karkkainen, Panarchyand Adaptive Change:Around the Loop and Back Again,
7 MINN. J. L. Sci. & TECH. 59, 66-67 (2005).

10. Edward 0. Wilson's works on evolutionary biology include EDWARD
(1975) [hereinafter
SOCIOBIOLOGY] and EDWARD 0. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE (1992).

WILSON,

SOCIOBIOLOGY:

THE

NEW

SYNTHESIS

0.

WILSON,

11. Richard Dawkins published the groundbreaking evolutionary biology
book, The Selfish Gene. RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE (1976).
12. See infra note 249 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 247, 252, 263-66 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 259-61, 267 and accompanying text.
15. Although beyond the scope of this Article, it should be noted that in the
past several years there has been a substantial debate, both in the general
public and in the scholarly literature, about international trade in GMOs. See
generally Serge Frechette, Biotechnology, Food, and Agriculture Disputes or
Food Safety and InternationalTrade, 26 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 253 (2000); Lakshman
D. Guruswamy, Sustainable Agriculture: Do GMOs Imperil Biosafety?, 9 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 461 (2002); Katherine Ives, The Benefits of Biotechnology,
the Intersection of GATI WTO and Other Trade Issues, 10 MICH. ST. U. DETROIT
C.L. J. INT'L L. 13 (2001); Kevin C. Kennedy, InternationalTrade in Agriculture:
Where We've Been, Where We Are, and Where We're Headed, 10 MICH. ST. U.
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describes evolutionary biology theory and explores how it has been
employed to help shape many areas of the law. This Part VI further
demonstrates the value of drawing on principles of evolutionary
biology in developing a new regulatory approach to address the
novel risks of pesticidal GMOs. Finally, a new evolutionary biology
model for regulating GMOs is presented in Part VII.
II.

UNNATURAL SELECTION AND THE CASE OF THE
"POPCORN SHRIMP"

Consider the following scenario. A genetic engineering company
produces GM corn that contains the gene from a particular type of
shrimp, which enables the corn plant itself to produce a toxin
normally produced by the shrimp. 6 Although the toxin is not
generally particularly toxic to humans and other mammals, it kills
corn earworms-a major economic pest of corn-thereby drastically
reducing the amount of chemical pesticide that farmers apply to
their corn crops. Because the risks of the shrimp toxin to humans
have not been fully evaluated, the GM corn is approved only for
animal feed and is not approved for human food use.
In accordance with current federal pesticide law, the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA"), 7 EPA
conducts a cost-benefit analysis and concludes that the benefits of
the GM corn outweigh its risks, provided the bags of seed are
labeled to ensure seeds are not planted near water where the GMO
can adversely affect aquatic organisms and to prohibit the seeds
from being planted in certain parts of the country during bird
migration season to limit exposure to migratory birds. EPA is not
concerned about the spread of the corn because the biotech company
that manufactures it has such a financial stake in selling its product
and protecting its research and development investment that it will
ensure the seeds are only sold to farmers who agree to follow all of
the regulatory restrictions.
Fast forward. The GM corn makes its way into the animal feed
DETROIT C.L. J. INT'L L. 1 (2001); Gerry Kiely, WTO and Market Access:
Subsidies, Tarification and Barriers to Freer Trade, 10 MICH. ST. U. DETROIT

C.L. J. INT'L L. 7 (2001); Darren Smits & Sean Zaboroski, GMOs: Chumps or
Champs of InternationalTrade?, 1 AsPER REV. INT'L Bus. & TRADE L. 111 (2001);
Sabrina Safrin, Comment, Treaties in Collision? The Biosafety Protocol and the
World Trade Organization Agreements, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 606 (2002); Holly
Saigo, Note, Agricultural Biotechnology and the Negotiation of the Biosafety
Protocol, 12 GEO. INT'L ENvTL. L. REV. 779 (2000).

16. The author would like to recognize Professor Patricia Dilley for
suggesting to the author that this scenario gives new meaning to the term
"popcorn shrimp."
17. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (2000).
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marketplace. The farmers using the engineered corn save money on
pesticides and have increased crop yield, and the environment is
spared from large amounts of chemical pesticides being sprayed onto
farm fields. During the next growing season, some farmers decide to
ignore their agreement with the biotechnology company and replant
the GM seeds from last year's corn rather than buy the expensive
new seeds. Some farmers deliver their seed to silos where GM seed
is mixed in with non-GM seed. Thus, the next season's GM seed is
not properly segregated from non-GM seed and some GM corn
makes its way into the human food market. Unwary consumers
purchase the corn and consume the shrimp toxin. Although the
majority of the population is not affected, people who are allergic to
shrimp may have reactions without knowing where they were
exposed. Similarly, people who follow dietary laws for religious or
philosophical reasons, such as people who keep kosher or
vegetarians, do not know they are eating food containing a shrimp
gene.
Meanwhile, out in the farm field, because the GM corn is a
living organism, it can reproduce and spread in the environment.
The GM corn pollen is carried by the wind where it fertilizes other
cornfields, including nearby "organic" cornfields. If the corn is
tested and discovered to be genetically modified, the organic farmer
will suffer severe economic loss because she cannot legally sell GM
food as "organic."18 The pollen also fertilizes a grassy weed that is a
close genetic relative of the corn. The weed now contains the shrimp
toxin and is protected from predation by insect pests that normally
keep the weed population in check. The weed now has a selective
advantage in the wild and takes over as a "superweed," crowding out
all of the indigenous plants that normally grow in the area. The
seeds of the weed also are food for seed-eating migratory birds flying
through the area on their yearly migration, so the birds are now
exposed to the toxin and suffer ill effects. Although the original seed
bags warned farmers not to plant seed within 100 feet of streams
due to the toxicity to aquatic organisms, such warnings do not
prevent the new superweeds from spreading along streambeds.
Moreover, subsequent generations of seeds that farmers sent to silos
or saved to replant will not contain such warnings. Thus,
unsuspecting farmers may plant seeds in inappropriate places
during bird migration season, thereby creating risk to a number of
protected avian species. Finally, there are now so many plants (corn
and weeds) pumping out the shrimp toxin on a continual basis that
the corn earworm begins to develop resistance not only to the
shrimp toxin, but also to a commonly used chemical pesticide that
18. See 7 C.F.R. §§ 205.202, 205.105, 205.2 (2006).
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has a similar chemical structure. As with the phenomenon of
antibiotic resistance, an important pesticide is rapidly losing its
efficacy.
This fact pattern, although fictional, illustrates the far-reaching
potential risks from the release of GMOs that have been modified to
be more "fit" from an evolutionary standpoint. Some of these risks
arise from the fact that a living organism is being introduced into an
environment in which it has not naturally evolved to exist. Similar
risks can result from introducing non-native species into an
environment or from increasing the population of a naturally
occurring species beyond natural levels. But some of these risks are
of a type that simply would not exist if it were not for the genetic
manipulation of organisms. Only through genetic manipulation can
a shrimp toxin be produced by a corn plant, and only through
genetic manipulation can a corn plant pass on such genes to a weedy
relative, thereby dramatically improving its evolutionary fitness and
turning it into a superweed. While this scenario may seem farfetched or worst-case, it is not. Many of the events described
actually have occurred in the past few years as a result of the
commercialization of pesticidal GMOs.
Probably the most well-known example of the problems that can
arise from the release of pesticidal GMOs into the environment is
the recent case involving StarLink corn. StarLink corn contained a
protein that was similar to a protein found in peanuts; peanuts
contain many proteins that can cause severe allergies in humans.
Thus, the StarLink corn was approved only for animal feed and was
not approved for human food use. Despite this limited approval,
testing by an environmental organization revealed the presence of
the StarLink gene in large batches of taco shells and other human
food corn products. 9 Farmers throughout the United States were
forced to destroy their crops. The farmers filed a class action
lawsuit.2 ° In addition, consumers alleging fraud, negligence, and

19. StarLink Corn: How it Reached the Food Supply, A.P., Dec. 4,
2002, http://archive.showmenews.com/2000/dec/20001204busiOl1.asp; see also
Rebecca M. Bratspies, Myths of Voluntary Compliance: Lessons from the
StarLink Corn Fiasco, 27 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REv. 593, 628-33
(2003); William Lin et al., U.S. Dept. of Agric., Econ. Research Serv., StarLink:
Impacts on the U.S. Corn Market and World Trade (2001),
http://www.ers.usda.gov/briefingbiotechnology/starlinkarticle.pdf.
20. In re StarLink Corn Prods. Liab. Litig., 212 F. Supp. 2d 828 (N.D. Ill.
2002). The defendants, Aventis CropScience USA Holdings and Garst Seed
Company, moved for dismissal, arguing that the farmers' claims were
preempted by FIFRA and that the economic loss rule barred recovery. Id. at
833. The trial court held that FIFRA did not preempt the farmers' claims, that
the contamination of crops by neighboring GM crops provided a claim to which
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breach of warranty for recklessly exposing millions of consumers to
these unapproved and potentially dangerous products filed class
21
action lawsuits. Moreover, corn products with the gene showed up
as far away as Japan and Korea, leading to a dramatic decline in
imports of U.S. corn products in these countries.22
Another documented instance of the risks illustrated by the
popcorn shrimp hypothetical is a case where the British government
ordered the destruction of experimental fields of herbicide-tolerant
oilseed rape plants because the GM forms had successfully
pollinated nearby "natural" plants. Such spread might have created
a new breed of "superweeds" resistant to herbicides and capable of
displacing other plant life. 23 In Canada, GM corn cross-pollinated a
neighboring field of "organic" corn, which could no longer be sold as
"organic."24 GM corn pollen has been found to cause significant risk
to monarch butterfly larvae in laboratory conditions.
Moreover, a

the economic loss rule did not apply, and that the plaintiffs had properly alleged
claims based on negligence, public nuisance, and private nuisance. Id. at 852.
21. Jill Carroll, Judge Will Approve Settlement on Use of StarLink Corn,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 2002, at A4.
22. See Rebecca M. Bratspies, Consuming (F)ears of Corn: Public Health
and Biopharming, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 371,387 (2004); Bratspies, supra note 19,
at 594-95; Lin et al., supra note 19, at 46.
23. Farmers Advised to Destroy GM Crops, BBC NEWS ONLINE, May 27,
2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk-news/politics/766539.stm.
24. Thomas Hayden, Bad Seeds in Court: When Genetically Modified Plants
Contaminate Their Crops, Organic Farmers Fight Big Biotech, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Jan. 28-Feb. 4, 2002, at 34. For an interesting twist on the
economic consequences of genetic contamination, see Monsanto Canada Inc. v.
Schmeiser, [2004] S.C.R. 902. Schmeiser, a farmer in Saskatchewan, was sued
by Monsanto for patent infringement when Schmeiser's canola crop was found
to contain the company's patented modified genes that made the crops
herbicide-resistant. Schmeiser did not have a license for use and did not
purchase the company's crop, yet ninety-five to ninety-eight percent of his 1998
crop consisted of the GM canola. The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the
patent infringement claim, but struck down the damages award as Schmeiser
used the canola solely for feed purposes and did not gain any particular
advantage from his usage of herbicide-resistant crops.
Id.
Schmeiser
countersued Monsanto for the contamination of his non-GM crops with the
herbicide-resistant canola. Id.
25. Wendy Thai, Recent Developments, Transgenic Crops: The Good, the
Bad, and the Laws, 6 MINN. J. L. Sci. & TECH. 877, 880 (2005); John E. Losey et
al., Transgenic Pollen Harms Monarch Larvae, 399 NATURE 214 (1999).
However, at least one other study has found negligible harm to monarch
butterflies. Marc Kaufman, 2nd Study Links Gene-Altered Corn, Butterfly
Deaths, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 2000, at A2; Rick Weiss, Gene-Spliced Corn No
Big Threat to Butterflies, Studies Say, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 1999, at A3. EPA
has prepared a document evaluating risks to Lepidoptera in general from Bt
plant-incorporated protectant.
AGRIC. BIOTECH. STEWARDSHIP TECHNICAL
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number of insect pests have demonstrated resistance to Bacillus
thuringiensis ("Bt"), an important low-risk nonengineered biological
pesticide that is a naturally occurring soil bacterium,
which has
been genetically engineered into a wide variety of crops including
21
corn, potatoes, and cotton.
III. THE RISKS OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS

The concept of risk includes elements of hazard and exposure.
GMOs present hazards and exposures that are different in both type
and degree than are the hazards and exposures presented by
traditional environmental chemicals. Toxicity is the typical hazard
presented by most traditional environmental chemicals.
With
regard to GMOs, hazards are expanded well beyond toxicity to
include hazards such as the creation of superweeds or pest
resistance. In addition, pathways for exposure to hazards may be
much greater and more widespread because GMOs are living
organisms spreading and reproducing in the environment.
Accordingly, there are a number of different types of risks associated
with GMOs. Some are very similar to the risks associated with
traditional pesticides and chemicals, some are similar to the risks
associated with the introduction of non-indigenous organisms into
new environments, and some are novel and result from the fact that
many GMOs are intentionally genetically modified to give them an
evolutionary selective advantage.
The traditional types of risks that are associated with some
GMOs include the toxicity of the organism or a chemical produced
by the organism, which could be toxic either to humans or to
wildlife. The second category of risks is similar to the risks
produced when non-indigenous organisms are introduced into new
environments. For GMOs, even a small change in the genetic
material of an organism can cause the organism to behave or

COMM.-NON-TARGET ORGANISM SUBCOMM. AND NOVIGEN SCIENCES, INC.,
AMENDED REVISED RESPONSE TO EPA's DATA CALL-IN NOTICE CONCERNING THE
POTENTIAL FOR ADVERSE EFFECTS OF BT CORN ON NON-TARGET LEPIDOPTERANS

(2001), available at http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/biopesticides/pips/executivesummary-and-preface.pdf.
26. Researchers at Texas A&M University have studied methods of
enhancing the resistance effects of Bt cotton, but have also noted that the
increasing pest-resistance qualities have a drawback-namely, those pests that
survive the natural toxin will propagate and lead to an increasing population of
Bt-resistant budworms and bollworms. See Steve Hill, Texas A&M University,
Science Hopes to Keep One Step Ahead of Adaptive Bugs, Sept. 6, 1996,
http://agnews.tamu.edu/stories/ENTO/adbugs.htm (last visited Dec. 19, 2006).
27. Jorg Romeis et al., Transgenic Crops Expressing Bacillus thuringiensis
Toxins and Biological Control, 24 NATuRE BIOTECH. 63, 63 (2006).
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reproduce in new ways, or both. In other words, even a small
change in an organism can create a new organism, which when
released into a new environment may behave differently than either
the original host or recipient organisms.
A third type of risk, distinctive to GMOs, is created by the
selective advantage provided to certain GMOs. In particular, GMOs
that are designed to have enhanced abilities to protect themselves
may have an evolutionary selective advantage in the environment.
For example, GM crops, such as those genetically enhanced to resist
disease, pests, or climatic conditions, will be able to out-compete
their non-enhanced relatives. By intentionally imposing selective
advantages into the organisms, humans have given the organisms
the potential to spread in the environment and pass their traits onto
future generations.
In this way, the evolutionary process is
accelerated. The organisms that have been enhanced may be more
evolutionarily "fit" and therefore more likely to survive. Because of
the very different types of risks associated with GMOs, any
regulatory system that does not take into consideration these risks
is inherently skewed. Accordingly, a new system should be designed
to address each type of risk rather than conflating these different
risks into one regulatory approach.
A.

TraditionalRisks: GMOs as Chemicals

Many of the risk considerations for GM plants are similar to, if
not the same as, those for traditional chemicals.
GM plants
typically have been modified by inserting genetic material into the
DNA of the plant that enables the plant to produce chemical
substances with some commercial purpose. Examples include GM
plants that produce pesticides that protect the plant from insects or
other pests and GM plants that produce industrial or
pharmaceutical chemical substances that can be extracted from the
plants and used commercially.
As with any chemical risk
assessment, the underlying considerations of analyzing risks posed
by GM plants are the potential for non-target organisms and
humans to be exposed to the substance produced by the GM plant
and the hazard (usually toxicity) of such substance to non-target
organisms, humans, and the environment.
Such hazard is
determined by the chemical and toxicological properties of the
substance.2" Although the risk of direct harm posed by exposure to
28. In addition to risks posed by the GMO itself, one category of GMOs may
result in the increased use of chemical pesticides, thereby increasing risks
associated with such chemicals. A number of crop plants have been genetically
modified to increase their resistance to certain herbicides. As a result of this
increased crop resistance to herbicides, farmers can apply herbicides at stages
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toxins may be familiar, exposure considerations can be very
different for GM plants than for traditional chemicals.
For
traditional chemicals, the primary factors in determining the
exposure component of risk are the amount of chemical that is
introduced into the environment and the likelihood that humans or
other non-target organisms will come into contact with the
chemical.2 9
One of the major concerns associated with GMOs is their
potential risks to human health, particularly through dietary
exposure. A human dietary issue that has received considerable
attention is the potential of GM foods to pose a risk of human
allergenicity.3 0 The primary concern appears to be that if a gene is
of crop growth when they will be the most effective in killing weeds. However,
if GM herbicide-tolerant plants cause farmers to use more herbicides or apply
herbicides more frequently, there may be an increase in environmental risk
associated with the increased use of the herbicide. In fact, recent studies show
a reduction in biodiversity in areas of some genetically modified herbicidetolerant crops due to increased herbicide usage resulting in a decrease in weeds
and other plants that produce seeds that are normally food sources for insects,
birds, and other species. L.G. FIRBANK ET AL., THE IMPLICATIONS OF SPRINGSOWN

GENETICALLY

MODIFIED

HERBICIDE

TOLERANT

CROPS

FOR

FARMLAND

BIODIVERSYy: A COMMENTARY ON THE FARM SCALE EVALUATIONS OF SPRING SOWN

19-20 (2003), available at http://www.defra.gov.uk/environmentgm/
fse/results/fse-commentary.pdf.
29. For a description of EPA's process for determining risks posed
by
pesticides,
see
generally
http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/factsheets/
riskassessment.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2007).
30. A full discussion of the human health risks associated with GMOs is
beyond the scope of this Article. Most of the public outcry against GMOs, as
well as much of the scholarly literature on GMO issues, has focused on the
human health risks. Issues relating to the safety of GMOs for human food use
have been at the forefront of the public debate on GMOs. See generally Marc
Lappe, Biotechnology and Agriculture, 10 MICH. ST. U. DETROIT C.L. J. INT'L L..
39 (2001); Jack Laurie, Biotechnology and Agriculture, 10 MICH. ST. U. DETROIT
C.L. J. INT'L L. 29 (2001); Ellen Messer, Food Systems and Dietary Perspective:
Are Genetically Modified Organisms the Best Way to Ensure Nutritionally
Adequate Food?, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 65 (2001); Katharine Van Tassel,
The Introduction of Biotech Food to the Tort System: Creating a New Duty to
Identify, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1645 (2004); Emily Robertson, Note, Finding a
Compromise in the Debate over Genetically Modified Food: An Introduction to a
Model State Consumer Right-to-Know Act, 9 B.U. J. ScI. & TECH. L. 156 (2003).
In fact, in 2001, The New York Review of Books writer, Richard Lewontin,
commented that he had nineteen recent books and a fifteen-pound stack of
articles on his desk relating to genetically engineered foods. See Richard
Lewontin, Genes in the Food!, N.Y. REV. OF BooKS, June 21, 2001, at 81, 83
(reviewing four books on the risks and benefits of GMOs in food). One of the
hotly debated issues is whether foods containing GMOs should be labeled as
such so that consumers can make informed choices about the foods they eat.
See generally Emily Marden, Risk and Regulation: U.S. Regulatory Policy on
CROPS 1,
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moved from one organism, to which a certain segment of the
population has an allergy, to another food organism that is not
otherwise allergenic, allergic persons will not know that the GM
food is potentially allergenic to them. Consider, for example, the
popcorn shrimp scenario set forth above, in which a gene from
shrimp is inserted into corn plants. A certain segment of the human
population is allergic to shrimp. Those persons know to avoid eating
shrimp or other food products that are likely to contain shrimp
The allergic individuals,
products (such as seafood gumbo).
however, have no way of knowing, or even suspecting, that by eating
products that contain corn (such as tortilla chips), they may be
exposing themselves to the shrimp proteins to which they are
allergic. 31 Eliminating this risk would require mechanisms to
segregate the GM corn and to warn consumers that the GM corn
may be allergenic to people with shrimp allergies. Without such
protections, consumers will not be aware that by eating corn
products they may be exposed to substances normally produced by
Genetically Modified Food and Agriculture, 44 B.C. L. REV. 733, 759-63 (2003);
Frank J. Miskiel, Voluntary Labeling of Bioengineered Food: Cognitive
Dissonance in the Law, Science, and Public Policy, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 223
(2001); Lauren Zeichner, Product vs. Process: Two Labeling Regimes for
Genetically Engineered Foods and How They Relate to Consumer Preference, 27
ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL'Y J. 467 (2004); Sarah L. Kirby, Note, Genetically
Modified Foods: More Reasons to Label than Not, 6 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 351
(2001). To date, the United States has not required such labeling. In 2001, in
response to intense public concern over GMOs in the public food supply, as well
as requests from the GMO industry for guidance on labeling GM foods, the FDA
published a notice in the Federal Register providing guidance to assist
manufacturers who wish to voluntarily label their foods to indicate whether
they contain GM ingredients. Draft Guidance for Industry: Voluntary Labeling
Indicating Whether Foods Have or Have Not Been Developed Using
Bioengineering, 66 Fed. Reg. 4839-42 (Jan. 18, 2001). This notice does not
require food labeling, but merely provides guidance on appropriate labeling for
those producers who elect to label their food products. Id.
31. See generally Judith E. Beach, No "Killer Tomatoes": Easing Federal
Regulation of Genetically Engineered Plants, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 181, 186-87
(1998) (discussing FDA labeling regulations for allergens in GM foods). In
addition, the movement of genes from animals to plants may concern
subpopulations of people with special dietary preferences, such as vegetarians
or persons who observe kosher (Jewish) or halal (Muslim) laws, or may raise
ethical, philosophical, or religious concerns. D. DOUGLAS HOPKINS ET AL., ENVTL.
DEF. FUND, A MUTABLE FEAST: ASSURING FOOD SAFETY IN THE ERA OF GENETIC
ENGINEERING 10 (1991). Other philosophical issues that have been raised
include a concern that the prospect of "human-made" organisms, even if they
pose no risk to humans or the environment, may threaten the concepts of
"wildness" and "wilderness." See, e.g., MARGARET MELLON, NAT'L WILDLIFE
FED'N,
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32 (1988).
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shrimp, and allergic consumers could be put at risk.
Risk considerations for GMOs become even more complex with
regard to the likelihood of non-target (human or wildlife) exposure
to any hazardous substances produced by the GMOs. Exposure
considerations for GMOs are dependent, in large part, on the
biological characteristics of the modified organism itself. For
example, exposure to a substance produced by a GM plant is
determined in part by factors such as which particular plant parts
(e.g., leaves, stems, fruit, or roots) produce the substance and what
organisms consume or are associated with those plant parts.
Moreover, one of the most significant exposure considerations for
GM plants not seen for chemical pesticides is the potential for
spread of the living plant or the plant's genetic material. Plants can
reproduce sexually and/or asexually, and, as a result, the genetic
material that was introduced into the plant and that enables the
plant to produce the substance could spread through agricultural or
natural ecosystems. Thus, the capacity of a plant that has been
genetically modified to produce a particular pesticidal, industrial, or
pharmaceutical chemical substance and to spread in the
environment, or to spread its genetic material to other plants,
increases the risk of potential exposure to non-target organisms as
compared to a chemical substance produced in a plant that can only
grow in a limited geographic area or does not have the ability to
cross-fertilize with other plants in the environment. This is a
particular concern for GM plants that have wild relatives in the
United States. If these wild relatives acquire the ability to produce
the plant-pesticide through cross-fertilization, many additional nontarget organisms could be exposed to the chemical substance.3 2
B.

33
Novel Risks: GMOs as "Darwinin Hyperspeed"

When organisms are genetically modified to take on new traits,
such modification can be viewed as intentional "mutation." In other
words, the types of random mutations that occur in nature may
enhance selective advantage, reduce selective advantage, or be
neutral. In the case of genetic modifications that are intended to
impose protections on the plant itself, such as pest or disease

32. Other areas of potential adverse effects on the environment center on
specific plant-pesticides or categories of plant-pesticides. For example, plants
that are modified to produce viral coat proteins by inserting viral genetic
material into the plant's DNA may have the potential to result in the
development of new unintended viruses. See Mary Jane Angelo, Genetically
Engineered Plant Pesticides: Recent Developments in the EPA's Regulation of
Biotechnology, 7 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 257, 288 (1996).
33. Deacon & Paterson, supra note 4, at 590.
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resistance, the changes are by their nature mutations that impose
selective advantage on the organisms. Moreover, such changes may
be much more dramatic in type and magnitude than the types of
mutations typically occurring in nature. Such dramatic mutations,
from an evolutionary standpoint, may be analogous to the types of
rapid evolutionary changes that can occur in response to
catastrophic events or unusually harsh environmental conditions.34
The potential for a GMO or its genetic material to spread from
one plant to another raises additional risk issues beyond those of
exposure to humans and non-target organisms. One potential risk
of GM products parallels the risk of the introduction of any nonnative species into a new environment.35 Even very small genetic
manipulations can significantly change an organism's ability to
survive and flourish in a particular ecosystem.36 Examples abound
regarding the disastrous and unpredicted effects of introducing nonnative species into the environment, displacing native species. 37
Introducing GMOs into the environment could have similar
impacts.
One of the most significant risks is the risk of a
genetically engineered plant becoming a weed or pest itself or outcrossing to related species to create new weeds or pests.39 Once
released into the environment, the spread of a GMO may be
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to control. 40 For example, the
ability to produce a pesticide that makes a plant resistant to insect
or viral pests can be spread to a wild relative and subsequently
passed on to the relative's subsequent generations. Consequently,
the wild relative, by virtue of its newly acquired ability to resist
insects or viruses, has the potential to become a hardy weed, or
superweed.
One consideration in the superweed risk analysis is that for a
GM plant to transfer its genes to related existing weed species, wild
34. For an excellent discussion of how catastrophic events and harsh
environmental conditions can accelerate the pace of evolution, see generally
(1994).
35. David J. Earp, The Regulation of Genetically Engineered Plants: Is
Peter Rabbit Safe in Mr. McGregor's Transgenic Vegetable Patch?, 24 ENVTL. L.
JONATHAN WEINER, THE BEAK OF THE FINCH

1633, 1653-55 (1994); see also L. L. Wolfenbarger & P. R. Phifer, The Ecological
Risks and Benefits of Genetically Engineered Plants, 290 SCIENCE 2088, 2088

(2000).
36. Earp, supra note 35, at 1653; Wolfenbarger & Phifer, supra note 35, at
2088.
37. See Judy J. Kim, Note, Out of the Lab and into the Field:
Harmonization of Deliberate Release Regulations for Genetically Modified
Organisms, 16 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1160, 1166-67 (1993).

38. See Earp, supra note 35, at 1653.
39. Id. at 1654.
40. Id. at 1653-54.
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relatives of the GM plant must grow in the geographic areas where
the GM plant is introduced.4 1 Most major crops grown in the United
States are of foreign origin.42 Thus, hybridization between GM crops
and wild relatives is unlikely in the United States. Moreover, many
of the major U.S. crops, including soybeans, corn, and wheat have
been bred to the point where they have lost their ability to compete
with wild species in the nvironment. Thus, these crop plants are
unlikely to become weeds themselves when genetically altered. 4
However, many U.S. minor crops do have wild relatives in the
United States. 45 Further, once the GM crops are reproducing and
spreading in the environment, they can end up in geographic locales
far from the point of initial release or planting. Perhaps of even
greater concern is that once these GMOs are exported (intentionally
or otherwise) to other parts of the world that do have wild relatives
of the GMOs, the risks become more profound.
C. Economic Risks: Contaminationof Organic Crops and Pesticide
Resistance
Another type of novel risk posed by the potential for GM plants
to cross-pollinate other plants is an economic risk. One economic
cost that has arisen due to GMOs' ability to out-cross with non-GMO
crops is the genetic contamination of organically grown crops with
GM pollen. USDA regulations on Organic Labeling prohibit foods
containing GMOs from being labeled "organic."46 Organic farmers
41. Id. at 1666-69.
42. See JANE RISSLER & MARGARET MELLON, THE ECOLOGICAL RisKs OF
ENGINEERED CROPS 113 (1996) (showing the geographic origin of rice (southwest

Asia), soybeans (northeast Asia), wheat (Middle East), and corn (Central
America)).
43. Mary Jane Angelo, Embracing Uncertainty,Complexity and Change:An
Eco-Pragmatic Reinvention of a First Generation Environmental Law, 33

ECOLOGY L.Q. 105, 153 n.235 (2006).
44. See Earp, supra note 35, at 1654.
45. Meeting Minutes: FIFRA Scientific Advisory Panel Meeting, PlantIncorporated Protectants Based on Virus Coat Protein Genes: Science Issues
Associated with the Proposed Rule (Dec. 6-8, 2005), in SAP REPORT No. 2006-01
[hereinafter SAP REPORT].
46. See generally 7 C.F.R. §§ 205.300-.301 (2006). The regulation requires
product labels to differentiate between 100% organic, organic, and made with
organic materials. The product must meet varying statistical amounts of
organic constituents (i.e., a product to be labeled as "organic" must consist of at
least 95% organic ingredients, excluding water and salt). The product cannot
contain sulfites, and any nonorganic constituents must be either nonorganic
agricultural products that are not commercially available in an organic form,
or are products that are permitted under 7 C.F.R. § 205.605 (2006). See
USDA,
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who have fields near fields where GMO crops are grown and whose
crops become contaminated with low levels of pollen drift from the
GMO crops may not be able to sell their crops as organic, which may
result in lost revenue to organic farmers who are forced to sell such
crops on the lower-priced nonorganic market. For an organic farmer
to demonstrate that her crop does not contain GMOs, the farmer
will have to conduct expensive genetic testing. A recent survey of
major organic soybean and corn growers found that thirteen percent
of their product purchasers request crops to be tested for the
presence of GMOs. 7 The costs of such tests are approximately $300
per test.481 Moreover, many buyers of agricultural crops, such as
major food producers, have a zero tolerance standard for GMOs due
to strong consumer preferences. Perhaps the most significant blow
to the U.S. organic farming industry may be that European organic
producers are increasing exports of organic crops to the United
States. These European organic crops are lower-priced because
organic growers in Europe do not have to pay for genetic testing, as
GM crops are not widely grown in European Union countries. 4 9
In addition, serious concerns have arisen regarding the risk
that plants producing pesticidal substances such as the Bt toxin ° on
a continual basis may hasten the development of pest resistance to
these beneficial pesticides. 51 Many non-GM biological pesticides,
such as the naturally occurring Bt microbe, are relied on by organic
and nonorganic growers alike. These microbial pesticides are very
effective pesticides and are a relatively low risk to non-target
organisms. 52 They are applied to crops on an as-needed basis. When
a crop plant is genetically engineered to produce a pesticide, such as
the Bt toxin, in its tissue, it continually produces the toxin in all of
its cells over the course of its life. With tens of millions of acres of
labelTable.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2006).
47. ERICA WALZ, ORGANIC FARMING RES. FOUND., FOURTH NATIONAL ORGANIC
FARMER'S SURVEY 88 (2004), available at http://www.organicaginfo.org/

record.cfm?pkdoc id=3233&doc num=1.
48. Rick Gush, Organic Farming vs. Genetic Engineering, HOBBY FARMS,
Jan./Feb. 2006, at 28.
49. Id.
50. Bacillus thuringiensis,("Bt") is a naturally occurring soil microbe. This
microbe acts by forming a protein crystal, referred to as the delta endotoxin,
which is toxic to insects when ingested. See FUNDAMENTALS OF APPLIED
ENTOMOLOGY 239 (Robert E. Pfadt, ed., 1978).
51.

See Rebecca Bratspies, The Illusion of Care: Regulation, Uncertainty,

and Genetically Modified Food Crops, 10 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 297, 306-10 (2002)
(analyzing the problem of pest resistance with regard to Bt corn).
52. Mary Jane Angelo, Genetically Engineered Plant Pesticides: Recent
Developments in the EPA's Regulation of Biotechnology, 7 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 257, 259, 285 (1996).
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GM crops continually producing these toxins, pest species are
continually exposed to the toxin. Resistance to toxins will tend to
develop more quickly in populations of pest species that are
continually exposed to the toxin than in populations of species that
are only sporadically exposed.5 3 Evidence already exists that GM
crops producing the Bt toxin may be responsible for the development
of Bt resistance in certain pest species, such as the diamondback
moth.5 4 If such resistance continues to develop in other pest species,
growers will lose an important tool in their pest management
arsenal. This is of particular concern to organic growers, for whom
naturally occurring microbial pesticides such as Bt are among the
few pesticides
available to them that allow them to sell their crops
55
as "organic."
D.

UncertainRisks: New Technology and Lack of Experience

Perhaps the greatest concern with GM crops is simply the fact
that there is substantial scientific uncertainty regarding the
potential risks that could arise from genetically modifying crops and
introducing them into the environment and the human diet. Given
the relatively recent emergence of GM technology, our experience is
extremely limited. Although there has been widespread use of
certain GM crops for approximately ten years,56 the GMOs that are
in widespread use are primarily a few limited types, such as Bt,
viral coat proteins, and herbicide tolerance, in a few very wellunderstood crops, such as corn and soy." The fact that there have
not been widespread environmental or human health problems
resulting from the use of GMOs is not surprising. This limited

53. Matthew Rich, Note, The Debate over Genetically Modified Crops in the
United States: Reassessment of Notions of Harm, Difference, and Choice, 54
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 889, 893, 895 (2004). This is a similar phenomenon to the
bacterial resistance that is occurring with regard to the overuse of antibiotics.
See generally Michael Misocky, Comment, The Epidemic of Antibiotic
Resistance: A Legal Remedy to Eradicate the "Bugs" in the Treatment of
Infectious Diseases, 30 AKRON L. REV. 733 (1997).

54. See Bruce E. Tabashnik et al., One Gene in Diamondback Moth Confers
Resistance to Four Bacillus thuringiensis Toxins, 94 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI.

1640 (1997).
55. See 7 C.F.R. § 205 (2006) (non-GMO Bt is not contained in the list of
prohibited substances in 7 C.F.R. §§ 205.602-603).
56. Bratspies, supra note 51, at 303-04.
57.
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universe of GMOs is generally considered to be fairly innocuous. 5'
Moreover, it may take many years to fully understand the existence
and extent of any ecological disruptions that may be occurring as a
result of introducing these novel organisms into the environment.
What is perhaps of greater concern than the GMOs in current
widespread use, however, are the many GM products in the research
and development stage that may pose much more significant risks.
For example, research is being conducted on a variety of GM crops
that have been engineered to produce new types of pesticides and
pharmaceutical and industrial products. 9 If these GMOs are not
properly contained and are allowed to spread into the environment,
humans and wildlife alike could be unwittingly exposed to
hazardous pharmaceutical or industrial substances. 0
This discussion of the risks of GMOs is not intended to suggest
that GMOs have no benefits. For instance, many scientists believe
that GM pesticides may provide a less risky alternative to chemical
pesticides because many GMOs are less toxic than chemical
pesticides, more narrowly targeted towards the intended pest, and
This
released into the environment in smaller quantities. 1
58. Moreover, as some have noted, if some humans are experiencing health
problems from consuming GMOs, or if these GMOs are causing some ecological
disruptions, it may be very difficult to draw a causal connection between the
adverse effect and the GMO. For example, because GM foods are not labeled, a
human who is having health problems may not even be aware that she is
consuming GMOs, let alone be able to correlate consumption of the GMO with
the health effect. See id.
59. See Thai, supra note 25, at 879, 887 (2005); APHIS BIOTECHNOLOGY,
supra note 3, at 1.
60. See generally Thai, supra note 25, at 878-85.
61. Products of genetic engineering have the potential of providing
significant benefits to society through new or improved pharmaceuticals, foods,
industrial compounds, and substitutes for traditional chemical pesticides. For
example, traditional chemical pesticides often are of relatively high toxicity and
often are toxic to a broad range of organisms, including humans. In addition,
the manner in which traditional pesticides are applied-often sprayed over
large areas-typically results in significant exposure to non-target organisms.
GM pesticides, on the other hand, are generally of lower toxicity, target-specific,
and produced in relatively small quantities in the organism. Consequently,
non-target organisms are not as likely to be exposed to these pesticides as they
are to pesticides that are sprayed over large areas. Moreover, even if non-target
organisms are exposed to plant-pesticides, because these pesticides are often of
low toxicity and are generally target specific, non-target organisms are not as
likely to be adversely affected by these pesticides as they are with pesticides
that are more highly toxic or toxic to a broad spectrum of organisms. For
example, the Bt toxin is specific to specific groups of insects (e.g., Lepidoptera)
and is not toxic to humans or other mammals. Another example of where a
plant-pesticide is believed to have the potential for significant environmental
benefits is viral coat protein-mediated resistance. By genetically modifying
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discussion on the unique ecological risks posed by GM pesticides
highlights the complex ecological risks at issue and the large
amount of uncertainty regarding such risks to permit evaluation of
the extent to which the existing framework is poorly designed to
address these risks.
IV. U.S. REGULATION OF GMOs

A.

History (Coordinated Framework)
Whether and how the United States would regulate GMOs was
not addressed until 1984, when the Office of Science and Technology
Policies ("OSTP") published a document entitled Proposal for a
Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology.62
stated purpose of the document was

The

to provide a concise index of U.S. laws related to biotechnology,
to clarify the policies of the major regulatory agencies that will
plants to produce certain viral coat proteins, researchers have been able to
produce plants that are resistant to infection by particular viruses. For viruses
spread by vectors such as insects, the most common agricultural practice for
preventing viral attack is the use of chemical pesticides to control the insect
vector that spreads the virus. It is believed that the use of viral coat proteinmediated resistance would reduce the need for these chemical pesticides. In
addition to the environmental benefits of viral coat protein-mediated resistance,
there is a high potential for significant economic benefits. Another potential
environmental benefit is the reduction of run-off of agricultural chemicals such
as pesticides and fertilizers, which can contaminate surface and ground water.
For example, the rDNA technique may be used to create plants with improved
photosynthetic and nitrogen fixation capabilities, thereby reducing the need to
apply fertilizers. Angelo, supra note 32, at 284-86; Proposed Policy, PlantPesticides Subject to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act,
and the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 59 Fed. Reg. 60,496 (Nov. 23,
1994). Despite the potential benefits of GM crops, recent studies suggest that
the benefits may be short-lived or may be offset by unexpected consequences.
For example, a recent study conducted by scientists at Cornell University
demonstrates that growing secondary pest populations have slowly eroded the
benefits of Bt technology in China. Shenghui Wang et al., Tarnishing Silver
Bullets: Bt Technology Adoption, Bounded Rationality and the Outbreak of
Secondary Pest Infestations in China (paper prepared for presentation at the
American Agricultural Economic Association Annual Meeting, July 22-26,
2006), available at http://www.grain.org/ researchfiles/SWang tarnished.pdf.
62. 49 Fed. Reg. 50,856 (Dec. 31, 1984).
Although commonly used
interrelatedly with genetic engineering, the U.S. government has defined the
term "biotechnology" as: "the use of various biological processes, both
traditional and newly devised, to make products and perform services from
living organisms or their components." Exercise of Federal Oversight Within
Scope of Statutory Authority: Planned Introductions of Biotechnology Products
into the Environment, 57 Fed. Reg. 6753, 6754 (Feb. 27, 1992).
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be involved in reviewing research and products of
biotechnology, to describe a scientific advisory mechanism for
assessment of biotechnology issues, and to explain how the
activities of the Federal agencies in biotechnology will be
coordinated .63
In 1986, OSTP published the final announcement of policy and
notice for public comment in CoordinatedFramework for Regulation
of Biotechnology (the "CoordinatedFramework").64
The Coordinated Framework articulated two major policy
choices that set the stage for at least the next twenty years of U.S.
regulation of biotechnology.
First, the document stated that
biotechnology could be adequately regulated under existing legal
authorities and that new legal authorities were not necessary to
address emerging technologies.65 Second, the document articulated
a policy position that the "products" of biotechnology would be
regulated rather than the "process" by which such products were
created.66 Specifically, the Coordinated Framework stated that
"techniques of biotechnology are not inherently risky and that
biotechnology should not be regulated as a process, but rather that
the products of biotechnology should be regulated in the same way
as products of other technologies.6 7 In other words, the Coordinated
63. Proposal for a Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology,
49 Fed. Reg. at 50,856.
64. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg.
23,302 (June 26, 1986).
65. Id. at 23,306. The document stated: "Upon examination of the existing
laws available for the regulation of products developed by traditional genetic
manipulation techniques, the working group concluded that, for the most part,
these laws as currently implemented would address regulatory needs
adequately." Id. at 23,303.
66. Id. at 23,302-04. The document provides: "The manufacture by the
newer technologies of food, the development of new drugs, medical devices,
biologics for humans and animals, and pesticides, will be reviewed by FDA,
USDA and EPA in essentially the same manner for safety and efficacy as
products obtained by other techniques." Id. at 23,304. The process versus
product debate extends beyond the regulation of GMOs. For an interesting
discussion of the issues, see generally Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for
Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and the Regulation of Consumer
Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 525 (2004).
67. Thomas 0. McGarity, Seeds of Distrust: Federal Regulation of
Genetically Modified Foods, 35 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 403, 431 (2002) (quoting
COMM. ON GENETICALLY MODIFIED PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS, NAT'L RES. COUNCIL,
GENETICALLY MODIFIED PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS: SCIENCE AND REGULATION 25

(2000)). During the 1980s and early 1990s, the executive branch was focused on
promoting biotechnology as the United States' hope for a strong economic
future. The feeling at the time was that the United States had allowed Japan
to beat it in the electronics industry. The federal government was determined
not to allow this to happen with the biotech industry. During this time, Vice
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Framework set forth the position that the potential risks of genetic
modification were not dependent on the process by which such
modification was made, but instead depended only on the ultimate
product that was produced regardless of the process or technology
used.
In addition, the Coordinated Framework outlined the
relationship and coordination between five federal agencies
possessing legal authority in the regulation of biotechnology. These
agencies include EPA, USDA, FDA, the National Institutes of
Health ("NIH"), and the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration

("OSHA").

68

The two federal agencies identified in

the Coordinated Framework as having the primary authority to
regulate environmental risks posed by GMOs are EPA and USDA.6 9
The primary agency identified as having the authority to address
risks from GM food is FDA.7 °
B.

EnvironmentalProtectionAgency Authority
EPA is the primary federal agency charged with the regulation
of environmental risk-producing activity in the United States.7'
EPA regulates biotechnology products under at least three separate
statutory authorities.
For pesticidal GMOs (e.g., plants or
microorganisms that have been genetically modified to produce
pesticidal substances), EPA's authority is derived from FIFRA and
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FFDCA"). 2 FIFRA governs
the manufacture, sale, and distribution of pesticides in the United
States, and addresses both environmental and human health risks
associated with such pesticides. 73 The reach of EPA's authority
under FFDCA, on the other hand, extends only to pesticides in food,
and addresses only the human health risks associated with such
pesticides. 74 EPA's third authority for regulating GMOs is found in
Toxic Substances Control Act ("TSCA"), which is EPA's "catch-all"

President Dan Quayle's Council on Competitiveness became intensively
involved in planning for the commercialization of biotechnology. The message
was clear that regulatory agencies were not to stand in the way of biotechnology
and were not to develop any new regulatory programs. See THE PRESIDENT'S
COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, VICE PRESIDENT DAN QUAYLE, CHAIRMAN, REPORT
ON NATIONAL BIOTECHNOLOGY POLICY (Feb. 1991); see generally Marden, supra

note 30.
68. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg.
at 23,303.
69. Id. at 23,304-05.
70. Id.
71. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2000).
72. Id.
73. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (2000).
74. 21 U.S.C. § 342 (2000).
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authority for regulating substances that do not fall within the
jurisdictional bounds of its other authorities. 5 Although none of
these three statutes expressly addresses GMOs, and, in fact, GM
products were not even contemplated at the time the statutes were
initially passed, EPA has nonetheless interpreted them as providing
authority to regulate certain categories of GMOs.
The primary federal statute that regulates the environmental
risks associated with pesticides, whether conventional chemical
pesticides or organisms that have been genetically modified to
exhibit pesticidal characteristics, is FIFRA.6 The origins of FIFRA
are in the 1910 Federal Insecticide Act (the "Act"), which was a
classic consumer protection statute.7 7 It was designed to address
grievances from consumers, primarily farmers, that pesticides sold
to them were either too weak and therefore did not kill the pests, or
too strong, thereby harming the crops themselves.7 ' The Insecticide
Act relied heavily on labeling provisions to ensure claims about the
pesticides were accurate and also to provide information on the
proper use of the pesticide. 79 The Act was not designed to address
risks to the environment. The Act remained virtually unchanged
until 1972. During the crest of the environmental movement and in
response to the environmental concerns regarding pesticides that
were raised in Rachel Carson's Silent Spring, ° attempts were made
to bring environmental concerns into the Act.81 The most significant
aspect of the 1972 FIFRA was the addition of the cost-benefit
balancing criteria, which a pesticide must meet to receive and
maintain a registration. Despite some congressional tinkering over
the years, the 1972 FIFRA continues to form the current backbone
15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (2000).
7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (2000).

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id. at 11.

80.

RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962).

CHRISTOPHER J. Bosso, PESTICIDES AND POLITICS

53-60 (1987).

81. Compared to other areas of environmental law, pesticide law is unique
in that it attempts to address the risks of substances that are intentionally
released into the environment for the sole purpose of destroying living
organisms. Other areas of environmental law address controlling substances
that are released into the environment by accident or as a byproduct of
contained processes. These types of releases can be prevented or minimized to
acceptable levels through technological fixes and legal systems that deter
behavior that leads to unacceptable releases. Once an unacceptable release
occurs, steps can be taken to mitigate the release and, if necessary, clean up the
contamination. In other cases, less toxic substances can be used in commercial
processes so that if releases do occur, the affects will be minimized. With
pesticides, however, releases of the toxic substance are not just an unfortunate
consequence, they are the goal. See Angelo, supranote 43, at 109.
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of pesticide law in the United States.
FIFRA's primary regulatory tools are the requirement for every
pesticide to be registered and the use of labeling restrictions to
minimize adverse impacts to humans and the environment. 2
Section 3 of FIFRA provides that no person may distribute or sell in
the United States any pesticide that is not registered under the
Act.8 3 FIFRA section 3(c)(5) requires that, before a pesticide may be
registered, the applicant has the burden of demonstrating that when
used in accordance with widespread and commonly recognized
practice, the pesticide "will not generally cause unreasonable
adverse effects on the environment."' FIFRA defines "unreasonable
adverse effects on the environment" as any unreasonable risk to
humans or the environment, "taking into account the economic,
social, and environmental costs and benefits of the use of any
pesticide.

8 5

Thus, FIFRA involves a balancing

of the risks

presented by the use of the pesticide against the benefits associated
with the use of that pesticide.8 6
EPA generally relies on labeling requirements to impose riskreduction measures on the use of traditional pesticide products. For
example, EPA regulations at 40 C.F.R. § 156.10 contain extensive
labeling requirements addressing, among other things, warnings,
precautionary statements, and directions for use.87 Other labeling
restrictions are imposed, case-by-case, through the registration
process.
Restrictive labeling may include anything from
requirements that personal protective equipment, such as gloves
and respirators, be used to reduce the risk to pesticide users, to the
requirement that a buffer zone be provided around fields to prevent
risks to bystanders from spray-drift, to geographic restrictions on
the use of certain pesticides to reduce the risk to endangered species
or other
beneficial organisms that occur in a limited geographical
88
area.
These labeling restrictions are translated into use

82. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a), (c)(9) (2000).
83. Id. § 136a(a).
84. Id. § 136a(c)(5)(D).
85. Id. § 136(bb).
86. The plain language of FIFRA does not mandate a strict cost-benefit
balancing. The statute merely requires that EPA "tak[e] into account" economic
and social as well as environmental considerations. Id. Nevertheless, EPA has
consistently interpreted and implemented this standard as a strict cost-benefit
balancing, and this interpretation has been upheld in a number of
administrative and judicial decisions. See, e.g., Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. EPA,
548 F.2d 998, 1005 (D.C. Cir. 1976); In re Chapman Chem. Co., 1 E.A.D. 199,
203 (EPA 1976); In re Protexall Prods., Inc., 2 E.A.D. 854 (EPA 1989).
87. 40 C.F.R. § 156.10 (2006).
88. Id.
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restrictions via FIFRA section 12(a)(2)(G), which provides that it is
unlawful for any person "to use any registered pesticide in a manner
inconsistent with its labeling."8 9
EPA has stated that it recognizes that many types of restrictive
labeling it relies on to regulate traditional chemical pesticides may
not be appropriate for pesticidal GMOs. 90 For example, geographical
limitations on the use of the GMO may not be meaningful if the
organism that produces the pesticide can reproduce and spread in
the environment beyond those geographical limits. Similarly, other
use restrictions (e.g., "Do not use within 100 feet of a stream, river,
or lake") may not be particularly useful if seeds from plants that
produce the pesticide are saved and planted during subsequent
growing seasons. Such seeds would not be labeled, and it is at least

89. 7 U.S.C. § 136j(a)(2)(G) (2000). EPA regulations require that every
pesticide bear a label that states, "It is a violation of Federal law to use this
product in a manner inconsistent with its labeling." 40 C.F.R. § 156.10(i)(2)(ii).
90. Proposed Policy; Plant Pesticides Subject to the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act and the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,
59 Fed. Reg. 60,496, 60,507 (Nov. 23, 1994). If a pesticide is found to pose an
unreasonable adverse effect on the environment after it is registered and in
commerce, FIFRA provides mechanisms for the cancellation of the pesticide
registration, or in the case of imminent risk, for the immediate and temporary
suspension of the registration. 7 U.S.C. § 136d(b) (2000). EPA is authorized to
cancel or suspend existing registrations based upon certain risk-benefit
determinations. EPA may issue a notice of intent to cancel if a pesticide or its
labeling does not comply with FIFRA or if, when used in accordance with
widespread and commonly recognized practice, the pesticide generally causes
unreasonable adverse effects on the environment. Id. Before taking final
action under section 6(b), the Administrator must determine whether any
unreasonable risks posed by a pesticide's use can be sufficiently reduced by
regulatory measures short of cancellation.
Id.
Such measures include
imposition of additional labeling restrictions and/or classification of the
pesticide for restricted use. Id. If the Administrator determines that adequate
risk reduction cannot be achieved by such regulatory measures, the registration
of the pesticide for that use must be cancelled. FIFRA also authorizes EPA to
suspend the registration of a pesticide based on certain findings. FIFRA
provides for two types of suspension proceedings-"ordinary" and "emergency"
suspensions. Id. § 136d(c). Ordinary suspension is issued where such action is
necessary to prevent an imminent hazard during the time required for
cancellation proceeding. Id. § 136d(c)(1). "Imminent hazard" is defined as a
likelihood of serious harm during the duration of cancellation proceedings. Id. §
136(). The function of a suspension action is to assess the evidence required to
determine the risks and benefits for the period involved, not an ultimate
resolution of the cancellation issues. An emergency suspension order, which is
effective immediately, may be issued if an emergency exists that does not
permit even an expedited hearing before suspension takes place. Id. §
136d(c)(3). FIFRA also authorizes EPA to order a recall of unused pesticide as
part of a cancellation. Id. § 136k(a).
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possible that farmers using these seeds would not even be aware
that the seeds were from plants that had been engineered to produce
a pesticide.
To date, EPA's regulation of GMOs has focused on three
categories: (1) the regulation under FIFRA and FFDCA of
genetically modified microbial organisms that have pesticidal
characteristics; (2) the regulation under FIFRA and FFDCA of
genetically modified plants that have pesticidal characteristics; and
(3) the regulation under TSCA of genetically modified
microorganisms that do not have pesticidal characteristics. EPA
does not yet have any rules governing GM animals.
Currently, EPA regulates pesticidal GMOs under FIFRA in
much the same way as it does traditional chemical pesticides. 91
Thus, for pesticidal GMOs, EPA uses its authority under FIFRA to
regulate the "pesticide," rather than targeting regulation at the
process by which the pesticide is created.92 Section 2(u) of FIFRA
defines the term "pesticide" as: "(1) any substance or mixture of
substances intended for preventing, destroying, repelling, or
mitigating any pest, [and] (2) any substance or mixture of
substances intended for use as a plant regulator, defoliant, or
desiccant .... This definition is very broad and can include living
organisms and substances produced by living organisms, as well as
traditional chemical pesticides. EPA has interpreted this definition
to include pesticidal GMOs.
Thus, pesticidal GMOs must be
registered under FIFRA prior to sale or distribution in the United
States. The standard for registration is the same for pesticidal
GMOs as for traditional chemicals. 94
During the 1990s, EPA attempted to develop a comprehensive
regulatory program for GMOs. Unfortunately, these efforts were
met with controversy, political pressure, scientific uncertainty, and
bureaucratic delay, which together resulted in regulations for GMOs
with very modest effect. The first EPA GMO final rule was the 199495
final rule on the regulation of GM microorganisms under FIFRA.
The other significant final regulation was the July 19, 2001, rule for
the regulation of GM pesticidal plants, which EPA currently calls
"plant-incorporated protectants," under FIFRA.96 Each of these
91. See Angelo, supra note 43, at 174.
92. Id. at 171-72 n.328.
93. 7 U.S.C. § 136(u).
94. See Angelo, supra note 43, at 172.
95. Microbial Pesticides; Experimental Use Permits and Notifications,
Final Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. 45,611-12 (Sept. 1, 1994) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 172).
96. Regulations Under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act for Plant-Incorporated Protectants, 66 Fed. Reg. 37,772, 37,814 (July 19,
2001) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 152).
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rules took approximately ten years to develop. Countless public
hearings, scientific advisory council meetings, congressional
hearings, and interagency negotiations were held. Despite all of
these efforts, however, the resultant rules are quite modest and do
not really tackle the complex and novel risks of GMOs. The thrust
of the rules is to define the scope of regulation-i.e., to outline what
types of pesticidal GMOs EPA believes warrant regulation based on
risk-benefit considerations. Under the rules, many pesticidal GMOs
are not subject to regulation at all because EPA believes they pose a
low potential for risk to humans or the environment. The rules do
not, however, impose any new approaches to regulating pesticidal
GMOs. Instead, at least for the foreseeable future, EPA has chosen
to rely on the old standby of FIFRA regulation, with the cost-benefit
analysis leading to the label restriction. 97
1.

Microbial GM Pesticides Under FIFRA

The first category of pesticidal GMOs regulated by EPA under
FIFRA was microbial GMOs.
EPA had regulated naturally
occurring microbial pesticides, such as Bt, for years.9 8 In the early
1980s, when the pesticide industry began to develop microorganisms
that had been genetically modified to impart or enhance a pesticidal
characteristic, EPA began to regulate these organisms. Microbial
pesticides are regulated in much the same way as traditional
pesticides at the large-scale testing and registration stages.
However, with regard to small-scale testing of microbials, EPA
expressed concerns regarding the potential for adverse effects.
Small-scale testing of most traditional pesticides is generally
considered to pose very limited risks and thus, is typically not
regulated by EPA.
Because microbial pesticides are living
organisms that have the potential to reproduce and spread in the
environment, even small-scale testing can present unreasonable
adverse effects on the environment. 9 Thus, EPA promulgated a rule
that requires notification prior to any small-scale testing of certain
microbial pesticides, including microbial GMOs. 100
Section 5 of
FIFRA authorizes EPA to issue experimental use permits ("EUPs")
97. See Angelo, supra note 43, at 174.
98. Although Bt was first registered by EPA for use as a pesticide in 1959, it
was not the first microbe to be used as a pesticide. Between 1939 and 1951,
another bacterium, Bacillus popilliae, an obligate bacterial pathogen that causes a
milky disease in the larvae of the Japanese beetle and other scarab beetles, was
used in fourteen eastern states and the District of Columbia. See FUNDAMENTALS
OF APPLIED ENTOMOLOGY 239 (Robert E. Pfadt ed., 1978).

99. See Microbial Pesticides; Experimental Use Permits and Notifications,
Final Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. 45,600 (Sept. 1, 1994) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 172).
100. 40 C.F.R. § 172.45 (2006).

120
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for the testing of new pesticides or new uses of existing pesticides.' 0'
Under EPA's existing regulations, EUPs are generally issued for
large-scale testing of pesticides. 10 2 A large-scale test includes any
terrestrial application on a cumulative acreage of more than ten
acres of land or any aquatic application on more that one acre of
surface water. 01 3 For traditional pesticides, EPA presumes that tests
conducted on ten acres or less of land or one acre or less of water
0 4
("small-scale tests") would not require EUPs.1
For certain GM
microorganisms, however, EPA determined that even small-scale
tests warrant an evaluation.'
After almost ten years of deliberation and a series of EPA and
federal government-wide policy statements that were made

101. 7 U.S.C. § 136c(a) (2000) provides that the Administrator may issue an
EUP only if she determines that the applicant needs such a permit to
accumulate information necessary to register a pesticide under section 3 of
FIFRA.
102. 40 C.F.R. § 172.3 (2006).
103. Id. § 172.3(a), (c)(1)-(2).
104. Id.
105. In October 1984, EPA published a policy statement entitled "Microbial
Pesticides; Interim Policy on Small Scale Field Testing." 49 Fed. Reg. 40,659
(Oct. 17, 1984). In June 1986, EPA reiterated the provisions of the Interim
Policy Statement as part of the Office of Science and Technology Policy's
Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology. 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302
(June 26, 1986). These policy statements described EPA's concern about the
potential for adverse effects associated with small-scale environmental testing
of certain microbial pesticides. To address the situation, these statements
specified that EPA be notified prior to initiation of small-scale testing of all nonindigenous and genetically modified microbial pesticides. The purpose of the
notification was to allow EPA to conduct an assessment of these small-scale
tests in order to make a determination as to whether or not the test should be
carried out under an EUP that allows EPA oversight. In addition, the 1986
Policy stated EPA's plan for future rulemaking to codify the interpretation set
out in the policy. Subsequent to the issuance of the 1986 Policy, a number of
documents were issued by EPA or other parts of the federal government having
relevance to this final rule. See, e.g., EPA: Microbial Pesticides; Request for
Comment on Regulatory Approach, 54 Fed. Reg. 7026 (Feb. 15, 1989) (requesting
comment on issues related to this final rule); Office of Science and Technology
Policy: Principles for Federal Oversight of Biotechnology, 55 Fed. Reg. 31,118 (July
31, 1990) (addressing the appropriate scope of federal oversight of GMO
introduction and requesting comment); Office of Science and Technology: Exercise
of Federal Oversight Within Scope of Statutory Authority, 57 Fed. Reg. 6753 (Feb.
27, 1992); (addressing the appropriate scope of federal oversight of GMO
introduction); THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 67. In
addition, EPA made available to the public and to its FIFRA Scientific Advisory
Panel ("SAP") and Biotechnology Science Advisory Committee ("BSAC") several
draft proposals addressing the notification scheme for small-scale testing of certain
genetically modified microbial pesticides.
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available to EPA's Scientific Advisory Panel ("SAP")10 6 and the
Biotechnology Science Advisory Committee ("BSAC"), 10 7 on
September 1, 1994, EPA promulgated the final rule on experimental
use permits and notifications for GM pesticidal microorganisms. 10
The rule codifies the early screening procedure first set forth in the
Coordinated Framework by requiring notification before the
initiation of small-scale field testing of certain microbial pesticides
in order to determine whether an EUP is necessary.'09
The most controversial issue that arose during the lengthy
development of this rule was the appropriate scope of regulation.
EPA decided to require notification for "microbial pesticides whose
pesticidal properties have been imparted or enhanced by the
introduction of genetic material that has been deliberately
modified.""0 In other words, EPA rejected a "product-based" scope of

106. FIFRA section 25(d) requires EPA to submit draft proposed and final
rules to an advisory panel, the SAP, for comment as to the impact of the rules
on health and the environment. 7 U.S.C. § 136w(d) (2000). The comments,
evaluations, and recommendations of the SAP, and the response of the EPA
Administrator, must be published in the Federal Register. Id. Section 25(d)
permits the chairperson of the panel, after consultation with the Administrator,
to create temporary subpanels on specific projects to assist the full panel. Id.
Because of the unique issues associated with the regulation of biotechnology,
specialized SAP subpanels have been convened from time to time to address
biotechnology matters.
107. In the 1986 Coordinated Framework, EPA announced that it was
establishing a Science Advisory Committee for biotechnology to provide peer
review of specific product submissions under FIFRA, TSCA, and other EPA
statutes and scientific oversight of the Agency's biotechnology programs. See
Statement of Policy; Microbial Products Subject to the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act and the Toxic Substances Control Act, 51 Fed.
Reg. 23,313, 23,318 (June 26, 1986).
108. Microbial Pesticides; Experimental Use Permits and Notifications, 59 Fed.
Reg. 45,600 (Sept. 1, 1994) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 172) [hereinafter Microbial
Pesticides Rule]. The proposed rule, Microbial Pesticides; Experimental Use
Permits and Notifications, can be found at 58 Fed. Reg. 5878 (Jan. 22, 1993)
[hereinafter Microbial Pesticides Proposed Rule].
109. Microbial Pesticides Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. at 45,600. Under the rule,
testing conducted in facilities designed and operated to adequately contain the
microbial pesticide would not be subject to the notification requirements. Id. at
45,602. Records describing containment, however, would be required to be
developed and maintained. Id.
110. Id. at 45,601. In the proposed rule, EPA had identified three options for
defining the scope of GM microbial pesticides subject to notification
requirements. Microbial Pesticides Proposed Rule, 58 Fed. Reg. at 5882. EPA's
preferred option provided the most clear-cut scope of regulation. This is the
definition of scope EPA developed based on comments from the public in
response to earlier Federal Register announcements, the SAP subpanel, the
BSAC, and other agencies including USDA. The Agency preferred this option
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regulation in favor of a "process-based" one.'11 By defining the
regulated organisms as those whose genetic material had been
"deliberately modified,"1 12 EPA was drawing a regulatory line
between microorganisms that had not been genetically modified and
those that had, regardless of the resulting product.
One other issue that was somewhat controversial was whether
EPA should require notification for "non-indigenous" microbial
pesticides.
Under the 1984 policy statement and the 1986
CoordinatedFramework, EPA had been requiring notifications to be
submitted for all small-scale testing of non-indigenous organisms. 113
because it believed this option covered the appropriate microbial pesticides and
had a high degree of regulatory utility. Id. at 5882-85. Option two was similar
to option one because in both approaches EPA made the initial assessment of
the potential risks presented by certain categories of microbial pesticides.
Option two was based on the 1990 Office of Science and Technology ("OSTP")
policy statement, and read as follows:
Microbial pesticides that have been deliberately modified in
hereditary traits, with the exception of: 1) Microorganisms modified
solely: a) Through chemical or physical mutagenesis[;] b) By the
movement of nucleic acids using physiological processes including, but
not limited to, transduction, transformation, or conjugation; or c) By
plasmid loss or spontaneous deletion. 2) Organisms that have been
modified by the introduction of noncoding, nonexpressed nucleotide
sequences that cause no phenotypic or physiological changes in the
parental organism.
3) Organisms resulting from a deletion,
rearrangement, or amplification, within a single genome, including its
extrachromosomal elements.
Id. at 5882 (citation omitted). In both options one and two EPA directly
indicated the pesticides that are included in the scope rather than leaving the
risk determination up to the researcher. Option two is different than option one
in that it casts a somewhat different net of coverage. Option two was included
in the proposal for illustrative purposes only; comment was not solicited on this
option. Option three defined the scope of regulation as "[i]ndigenous microbial
pesticides for which specific pesticidal activities have been created or increased by
deliberate processes or techniques." Id. at 5883. Option three is significantly
different than options one and two in that, although the initial scope of option
three is much broader than the other options, it provides greater latitude on the
part of the researcher to assess whether the Agency must be notified prior to
small-scale environmental testing. Notification would not be required for
microbial pesticides whose pesticidal activities have been increased, but which are
unlikely to pose a greater risk in the test site environment, or for microorganisms
whose phenotype has been changed only by the microorganisms introduction into a
new environment, but which are unlikely to pose a greater risk in the test site
environment. Id.
111. Microbial Pesticides Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. at 45,600 (codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 172).
112. Microbial Pesticides Proposed Rule, 58 Fed. Reg. at 5882.
113. Proposed Policy Regarding Certain Microbial Products, 49 Fed. Reg.
50,880, 50,885-86 (Dec. 31, 1984); Statement of Policy; Microbial Products
Subject to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act and the Toxic
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In the final rule, EPA opted to require small-scale notification only
for those non-indigenous microbial pesticides that have not been
acted upon by USDA either by issuing or denying a permit or
EPA based this
determining that a permit is unnecessary.1 1 4
decision on its belief that to do otherwise and continue the
imposition of the notification requirement on all non-indigenous
microbial pesticides would constitute duplicative oversight because
USDA (through the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
("APHIS") already regulates small-scale testing of the vast majority
of these organisms. 115
The final rule also includes provisions that enable EPA to
testing results in
address
situations where small-scale
Section 172.57 requires
unanticipated and untoward effects.
persons using microbial pesticides in small-scale tests to submit any
information they obtain concerning the potential for unreasonable
adverse effects from the microbial pesticide," 6 and section 172.59
enables EPA to take immediate actions to prevent use of a microbial
pesticide if such use would create an imminent threat of substantial
harm to health or the environment."' Although EPA has developed
some data requirements geared to address potential risks from
microbial pesticides in general,"' EPA has not yet developed any
data requirements targeted specifically to microbial GMOs.
2.

GM Plant-IncorporatedProtectants Under FIFRA

Another category of pesticidal GMOs regulated by EPA under

Substances Control Act, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,313, 23,321 (June 26, 1986).
114. 40 C.F.R. § 172.45(a), (c) (2006). The final rule also contains several
provisions that were not very controversial and were not changed significantly
from what was proposed. In the final rule, testing conducted in facilities
designed and operated to adequately contain the microbial pesticide would not
be subject to the notification requirements. § 172.45(a)(2), (d)(2). Records
describing containment, however, would be required to be developed and
maintained. § 172.45(e)(4).
115. Microbial Pesticides Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. at 45,602.
116. 40 C.F.R. § 172.57.
117. Id. § 172.59. The final rule also amends 40 C.F.R. § 172.3 to clarify
EPA's rationale for presuming that an EUP is not required prior to small-scale
testing with most pesticides. The language of § 172.3 was modified to clarify
that the determination of whether an EUP is required would be based on risk
considerations, rather than on a definitional presumption about whether a
substance is a pesticide. This clarification has general applicability to all
pesticides and is not limited to microbial pesticides. Id. § 172.3.
118. The data requirements for microbial pesticides can be found at 40
C.F.R. § 158.740 (2006). These data requirements parallel the requirements for
traditional chemical pesticides and do not specifically address potential risks
caused by living organisms reproducing and spreading in the environment. Id.
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FIFRA are GM pesticidal plants, or "plant-incorporated protectants"
("PIPs"). 119 In July 2001, EPA published its long-awaited rule for the
regulation of PIPs under FIFRA. 120 EPA initially proposed a version
of what is now the PIP rule in 1994.121 In the 1994 proposal, EPA
identified several categories that it believed should be exempt from
The most
FIFRA regulation because they were low-risk. 122
significant proposed exemption was for PIPs that closely resemble
plants that could be created naturally or through traditional plant
breeding. EPA based this proposed exemption on the premise that
new exposures would be unlikely if the genetic material leading to
the production of the PIP is derived from a plant closely related to
the recipient plant.123
An example of this is using genetic
modification technology to insert a gene that is normally found in
one variety of corn into another variety of corn. EPA posited that
this type of GM plant would be exempt because it does not pose any
new risks that could
not have evolved naturally or through
24
traditional breeding.
119. A plant-incorporated protectant ("PIP") is defined as a pesticidal
substance that is intended to be produced in a living plant, or in the produce
thereof, and the genetic material necessary for its production. 40 C.F.R. §
152.3. As is described infra, EPA also regulates PIPs in food pursuant to the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act. See infra notes 142-45 and
accompanying text.
120. Regulations Under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act for Plant-Incorporated Protectants, 66 Fed. Reg. 37,772 (July 19, 2001)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 152 and 174). EPA does not yet have any rules
governing GM animals. EPA's first attempt to describe its plans to regulate
PIPs was in early 1994. On January 21, 1994, EPA held a joint meeting of a
sub-panel of the Agency's SAP and the BSAC to address certain scientific issues
related to the regulation of pesticidal substances produced in plants. For the
meeting, EPA made available to the public a draft proposal of a comprehensive
policy and four draft proposed rules, together referred to as the "draft proposal,"
developed under FIFRA and FFDCA. On November 23, 1994, EPA published in
the Federal Register somewhat modified versions of these draft documents,
together referred to as "the proposal." 59 Fed. Reg. 60,496, 60,519, 60,535,
60,542, 60,545 (Nov. 23, 1994). The proposal was intended to clarify the status
of PIPs, referred to as "plant-pesticides" in the 1994 proposal and later renamed
plant-incorporated protectants, under FIFRA and FFDCA, and outline what
types of PIPs EPA believed warranted regulation based on risk/benefit
considerations. The final PIP rule, promulgated in 2001, adopted some, but not
all, of the exemptions proposed in 1994. See 40 C.F.R. § 174. For an historical
discussion of the PIP rule, see generally Angelo, supra note 32, at 290-98.
121. Proposed Policy; Plant Pesticides Subject to the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act and the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act,
59 Fed. Reg. 60,496 (Nov. 23, 1994).
122. Id. at 60,500-01.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 60,502-03.

2007]

REGULATING EVOLUTION

EPA presented three options for the exemption. 5 All three
options focused on the relationship between the source organisms
and the recipient organisms. In other words, all three proposed
options were based on the "product" rather than the "process" by
which the product was created. Accordingly, in the proposed rule,
no distinction was drawn between PIPs created through
conventional plant breeding versus those created through genetic
engineering.'
Between 1994 and 2001, when it published the final PIP rule,
EPA held countless public hearings, scientific advisory council
127
meetings, congressional hearings, and interagency negotiations.
Despite all of these efforts, however, the resultant rule is quite
modest and does not really tackle the complex and novel risks of
GMOs. The thrust of the new rule merely defines the scope of what
types of pesticidal GMOs EPA believes warrant regulation. 128 The
125. Id. at 60,501.
126. Id. One category of pesticidal GMOs that EPA believed did not warrant
regulation were plants that have been genetically modified to contain genes
that are derived from closely related plants and thus will not cause new
exposures to non-target organisms. Under this proposal, the Bt delta-endotoxin
would not be exempt when it is produced in corn, for example, because the
delta-endotoxin is derived from a bacterium rather than from a plant that is
closely related to corn. Id. at 60,502-03.
A pesticidal substance that is
naturally produced by a certain variety of corn and is introduced into another
variety of corn, however, would be exempt. Another category that EPA
proposed to exempt were those plant-pesticides that would not be expected to
adversely affect non-target organisms because they are less likely to be directly
toxic because of their mechanism of action. Id. at 60,503. This category
consists of plant-pesticides that act primarily by affecting the plant so that
pests are inhibited from attaching to the plant, penetrating the plant's surface,
or invading the plant's tissue. Under this proposed exemption, a substance that
acts by causing a structural barrier to pest penetration in the plant would be
exempt. The third category that EPA proposed to exempt were plants that have
been genetically modified to contain the genes for coat proteins from a plant
virus. Id. at 60,503-04. This type of GMO acts essentially as a vaccine
protecting the plant from viruses. EPA proposed these GMOs for exemption
based on the fact that plant viruses are ubiquitous in the human food supply
and are not known to cause any adverse affects to humans or the environment.

Id.
127. Regulations Under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act for Plant-Incorporated Protectants, 66 Fed. Reg. 37,772, 37,775 (July 19,
2001).
128. Under EPA's definition of PIPs, all substances produced by plants and
intended for a pesticidal purpose are within EPA's jurisdiction, regardless of
whether the plant is genetically modified. However, not all PIPs within EPA's
jurisdiction warrant regulation under FIFRA. EPA believes that many PIPs do
not warrant any regulation under FIFRA because they pose a low probability of
risk and will not cause unreasonable adverse effects on the environment. For
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final rule exempts certain PIPs from all FIFRA regulatory
requirements, except for the requirement of reporting adverse
effects information.1 29 The exempt PIPs are those derived through
conventional plant breeding if the genetic material that encodes the
pesticidal substance or leads to the production of the pesticidal
substance is from a plant that is sexually compatible ° with the
recipient plant and if the genetic material has never been derived
from a source that is not sexually compatible with the recipient
plant. Because EPA has defined sexual compatibility as occurring
only through conventional breeding, only conventionally bred crops
are exempt from regulation. 3 In other words, in the 2001 final rule,
EPA rejected the "product-based" approach set forth in the 1994
proposed rule in favor of the "process-based" approach, which
exempts PIPs based on the process by which they were created. If a
PIP is developed through conventional plant breeding, it is exempt,
whereas, if the same PIP is developed through genetic engineering,
it is subject to regulation. Thus, in the final rule, EPA departed
from the "product-based" approach articulated in the Coordinated
Framework in favor of the "process-based" approach that the U.S.
government had steadfastly avoided in the 1980s and 1990s.13' The

scaling-back of the exemption was in response to public comments
received on the proposal, as well as to a joint EPA, SAP, and BSAC
meeting held in January 1994, in which the joint panel considered
the matter and supported the use of an exemption criteria based on
example, in 1982 EPA promulgated a regulation under FIFRA § 25(b) that
exempted all biological control agents from the requirements of FIFRA, except
for certain microorganisms. 40 C.F.R. § 152.20(a) (2006). This exemption was
promulgated because EPA found that microorganisms used as biological control
agents were adequately regulated by other federal agencies, such as USDA.
129. The final rule requires any person who produces, for sale or
distribution, a PIP exempt under the rule, or who obtains information regarding
adverse effects on human health or the environment alleged to have been
caused by the PIP, to submit such information to EPA. 40 C.F.R. § 174.71
(2006).
130. EPA defines the term "sexually compatible" in plants as when "a viable
zygote is formed only through the union of two gametes through conventional
breeding." 40 C.F.R. § 174.3.
131. EPA's rationale for exempting the products of conventional plant
breeding from FIFRA requirements is that conventionally bred plant varieties
have been used by humans for thousands of years without ill effects. Because
conventional breeding can only take place between plants that are sexually
compatible, it is likely that such plants already share, or have shared in the
past, genetic material, and, therefore, exposure to the new plant variety,
whether by humans or non-target organisms, will not likely be novel.
Regulations Under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act for
Plant-Incorporated Protectants, 66 Fed. Reg. at 37,794-95.
132. 40 C.F.R. § 152.20.
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the technology (i.e., process) used to produce the PIP.' 33 The joint
panel based its support on a combination of the uncertainties about
how genes would function in the new genetic background and the
importance of building public confidence in the products of genetic
engineering.
On the same day as the final PIP rule was published, EPA
published a request for additional comments on the exemptions it
proposed in 1994.1" Specifically, EPA solicited comment on the two
alternative approaches to PIPs derived from plants sexually
compatible with the recipient plant: (1) whether all PIPs derived
should be exempt regardless of the technique used to introduce the
PIP into the plant; and (2) whether EPA should establish a
notification process that would implement a screening procedure to
determine whether a PIP derived through genetic engineering from
a plant sexually compatible with the recipient qualifies for
exemption. 35 To date, EPA has not taken any action on either of the
two alternative approaches for which it sought additional comment

in 200 1.136
Accordingly, EPA's final PIP rule merely draws a line between
PIPs subject to regulation and those not subject to regulation under
FIFRA.' 37 The rule does not provide any provisions detailing how a
PIP will be evaluated and regulated under FIFRA. Once it is
determined that a substance is a pesticidal GMO subject to FIFRA
regulation, the regulatory process is similar to, with only very minor
modifications, the regulatory process for all pesticides-i.e.,
registration based on a cost-benefit analysis, labeling restrictions on
use, and cancellation or suspension for registered GMOs found to
pose unreasonable adverse effects. As described above, many of the
risks posed by GMOs are of a different character than those posed
by traditional chemical pesticides. Accordingly, existing FIFRA
data requirements,
labeling requirements,
and regulatory
'38
approaches are not adequate to address these risks. EPA has not
yet developed any data requirements whatsoever for GM pesticidal
plants, nor has it adopted any regulations addressing information

133. Plant-Incorporated
Protectants
(Formerly
Plant-Pesticides)
Supplemental Proposal, 66 Fed. Reg. 37,855, 37,857-58.
134. Id., at 37,855.
135. Id. at 37,858-61.
136. Interview by Mary Jane Angelo with Laurel Celeste, EPA Attorney
(May 23, 2006).
137. Regulations Under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act for Plant-Incorporated Protectants (Formerly Plant-Pesticides), 66 Fed.
Reg. 37,772 (July 19, 2001).
138. See generally id.
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requirements
support
registration,'
product labeling
•
140 to
requirements, or experimental use permitting for PIPs.14' In the
absence of any such new requirements, EPA relies on existing
requirements that were crafted for traditional chemical pesticides to
regulate GM plants, regardless of the poor fit with GMOs.
3. GM Pesticides in Food Under the FFDCA
In addition to regulating pesticides under FIFRA, EPA is
responsible for regulating pesticide residues in human food or
animal feed under FFDCA."' Pursuant to section 408(a) of FFDCA,
a pesticide chemical residue in or on food is not considered to be safe
unless EPA has issued a tolerance for such residue and the residue
is within the tolerance limits. 4 3 EPA may issue an exemption from

the requirements of a tolerance if EPA determines that "there is a
reasonable certainty that no harm will result from aggregate
exposure to the pesticide chemical residue, including all anticipated
dietary exposures and all other exposures for which there is reliable
information." 144

In

the 2001 final PIP rule, EPA adopted an

exemption under this standard. As with FIFRA PIP exemptions,
EPA's FFDCA exemption for PIPs focuses on sexual compatibility
through conventional breeding.141
139. 40 C.F.R. § 174 pt. H (2006) (reserving a subpart for future data
requirements).
140. Id. § 174 pt. G (reserving a subpart for future labeling requirements).
141. Id. § 174 pt. U (reserving a subpart for future experimental use permit
requirements).
142. 21 U.S.C. § 346 (2000). The Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, which
created EPA, granted EPA authority to establish tolerances for residues of
pesticide chemicals in foods and animal feeds. Reorganization Plan No. 3 of
1970, 3 C.F.R. 199 (1970 Comp.), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. 184, and in 84 Stat.
2086 (1970-71). Regulatory authority over other non-pesticidal substances in
foods and animal feeds was left within the jurisdiction of the FDA.
143. 21 U.S.C. § 346a(a)(1).
144. Id. § 346a(c)(2)(A).

145. 40 C.F.R. § 174.479 (2006). This exemption provides:
Residues of a pesticidal substance that is part of a plant-incorporated
protectant from a sexually compatible plant are exempt from the
requirement of a tolerance if all the following conditions are met: (a)
The genetic material that encodes for the pesticidal substance or leads
to the production of the pesticidal substance is from a plant that is
sexually compatible with the recipient food plant. (b) The genetic
material has never been derived from a source that is not sexually
compatible with the recipient food plant. (c) The residues of the
pesticidal substance are not present in food from the plant at levels
that are injurious or deleterious to human health.
Id. In addition, EPA has exempted from the tolerance requirement nucleic
acids that are part of PIPs. In addition, EPA exempted inert ingredients from
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Non-Pesticidal GMOs Under TSCA

In addition to regulating biotechnology products that act as
pesticides under FIFRA and FFDCA, EPA also has authority to
regulate GMOs under TSCA.'46 The regulatory jurisdiction under
TSCA extends to all chemical substances, which are defined as
"organic or inorganic substance[s] of a particular molecular identity,
including ...any combination of such substances occurring in whole

or in part as a result of a chemical reaction or occurring in nature,"
but excluding pesticides.'47
EPA has interpreted this broad
48
definition of chemical substances to include living organisms.
Under section 5 of TSCA, all new chemical substances are
automatically covered and subject to a ninety-day screening
49
mechanism, known as a Pre-Manufacture Notification ("PMN").1
Upon receiving a PMN for a new chemical substance, EPA has
sexually compatible plants. Id. § 174.485. This exemption provides:
An inert ingredient, and residues of the inert ingredient, are exempt if
all of the following conditions are met: (a) The genetic material that
encodes the inert ingredient or leads to the production of the inert
ingredient is derived from a plant sexually compatible with the
recipient food plant. (b) The genetic material has never been derived
from a source that is not sexually compatible with the recipient food
plant. (c) The residues of the inert ingredient are not present in food
from the plant at levels that are injurious or deleterious to human
health.
Id. "Inert ingredient" is defined as
any substance, such as a selectable marker, other than the active
ingredient, where the substance is used to confirm or ensure the
presence of the active ingredient, and includes the genetic material
necessary for the production of the substance, provided that genetic
material is intentionally introduced into a living plant in addition to
the active ingredient.
Id. § 174.3. EPA has also exempted from the tolerance requirement nucleic
acids that are part of PIPs and the residues of certain Bt in specified crop foods.
Id. §§ 174.455-.456 (exempting from the requirement for a tolerance Bt CrylF
protein and the genetic material necessary for its production in cotton and Bt
modified Cry3A protein (mCry3A) and the genetic material necessary for its
production in corn, respectively).

146. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (2000).
147. Id. § 2602(2)(A)-(B).
Certain substances are by statute explicitly
excluded from TSCA jurisdiction. These are substances that are covered by
other regulatory authorities, such as food, drugs, cosmetics, firearms, and

pesticides. Id. § 2602(2)(B).
148. 40 C.F.R § 710.26(c). EPA's interpretation is that living organisms,
whether naturally occurring or genetically modified, are made up of a
combination of substances of particular identities that occur in nature or occur
in whole or part as a result of a chemical reaction. Accordingly, EPA has
treated living organisms as chemical substances under TSCA.
149. 15 U.S.C. § 2 604(a) (2000).

130

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

ninety days to perform screening to determine whether it is
necessary to impose controls to prevent unreasonable risk or
substantial exposure to the chemical.1 50 If EPA fails to take action
within the ninety-day period, the new chemical substance may be
manufactured, processed, distributed, sold, used, or disposed.' 5'
In 1997, EPA adopted a final rule governing pre-manufacture
review under TSCA section 5 of certain genetically modified
microorganisms. The rule defines a "new" microorganism to be one
formed by the deliberate combination of genetic material from
source organisms classified in different taxonomic genera that is not
on TSCA inventory. 1, 2 EPA's interpretation is that any genetic
modification of a microorganism where genetic material from an
organism in one genus is inserted into an organism from a different
genus is a "new" microorganism subject to TSCA section 5
requirements." 3 The rationale behind this interpretation is that
intergeneric
microorganisms
have
significant potential for
exhibiting new traits or combinations of traits." 4
Thus, these
organisms have the potential to result in new types of risks in the
environment.
Such "new" microorganisms
could include
microorganisms used commercially for such purposes as production
of industrial enzymes and other specialty chemicals, non-pesticidal
agricultural practices (e.g., biofertilizers), and break-down of
chemical pollutants in the environment.
The rule creates a reporting vehicle designed specifically for
new microorganisms called the Microbial Commercial Activity
Notice ("MCAN")."' 5 An MCAN must be submitted at least ninety
days prior to the use of intergeneric microorganisms for commercial
purposes in the United States, providing EPA with a ninety-day
opportunity to review the new GMO to determine whether
additional regulations are necessary to prevent unreasonable risks
150. Id.
151. Id. § 2604(g).
152. 40 C.F.R. § 725.3 (2006).
153. As with the microbial pesticides under FIFRA, one of the most
significant issues surrounding the regulation of biotechnology products under
TSCA is the issue of the appropriate scope of regulation. EPA first announced
its interpretation that a "new" microorganism is an intergeneric microorganism
in the 1986 Coordinated Framework. See Coordinated Framework for
Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302, 23,307 (June 26, 1986).
154. By using "intergeneric" as the definition of a new microorganism, EPA
was abiding by the principles articulated in the Coordinated Framework to focus
regulations on product rather than the process by which the product was created.
Id. at 23,302. In other words, all intergeneric microorganisms are subject to the
regulation regardless of whether they were created by genetic engineering or some
other process.
155. 40 C.F.R. § 725.3 (2006).
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or substantial exposure.156
Although EPA has established the MCAN notification processes
for intergeneric microorganisms, it has not promulgated any rules
addressing how to evaluate or reduce risks from such organisms.
Neither has EPA promulgated any rules addressing GM plants or
animals under TSCA. Nevertheless, EPA has repeatedly stated that
it intends to address TSCA oversight of transgenic157 plants and
other organisms. 15' EPA has not provided a specific timetable for
developing such regulation.'59
C.

FDA Authority

FDA's primary authority governing the regulation of GM foods

156. Id. § 725.50. The rule also addresses intergeneric microorganisms used
in research and development for commercial purposes and creates a
requirement for reporting on testing new microorganisms in the environment.
Id. § 725.1. This requirement is referred to as the TSCA Experimental Release
Application ("TERA"). Id. A TERA must be submitted at least sixty days prior
to initiating such a field trial. Id. § 725.250(a). TERA provides a shorter review
period than MCAN to provide more flexibility to researchers conducting limited
TSCA section 5(h) provides certain exemptions from the
field testing.
The sections most
Premanufacture Notice ("PMN") screening process.
applicable to intergeneric microorganisms are sections 5(h)(3) and (5)(h)(4). 15
Section 5(h)(3) exempts substances
U.S.C. § 2604(h)(3)-(4) (2000).
manufactured or processed only in "small quantities" for research and
development (R&D) from PMN requirements. Id. § 2604(h)(3). TSCA section
5(h)(4) authorizes EPA to exempt by rule the manufacture of any new chemical
substance if EPA determines that use of such substance will not present an
unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment. Id. § 2604(h)(4)
(2000). In addition, the rule exempts from MCAN requirements intergeneric
microorganisms used in R&D in contained structures, provided adequate
containment requirements are met and researchers maintain records. 40
C.F.R. §§ 725.428, 725.450(d).
157. The term "transgenic" refers to an organism created through genetic
engineering by moving a gene from one organism to another.
158. TSCA Policy Statement on Oversight of Transgenic Organisms
(Including Plants), 70 Fed. Reg. 27,625, 27,631 (May 16, 2005). EPA stated that
recent information suggests that transgenic plants and other organisms are
being developed for uses which appear to be subject to TSCA jurisdiction. Id.
EPA provided examples such as plants that are being genetically modified to
produce industrial grade oils. Id. EPA noted that while many of these plants
are subject to oversight by the USDA's APHIS, these plants cease to be subject
to regulation by USDA while being tested in the environment following APHIS
approval of a petition for nonregulated status. Id. Moreover, EPA notes that
transgenic animals that are not under the jurisdiction of FDA appear to be
subject to TSCA. Id. The policy statement would address whether EPA should
exercise jurisdiction under TSCA over such transgenic organisms prior to their
commercial use. Id.
159. Id.
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is found in section 402(a)(2)(C) of FFDCA. 160 This section provides
that a food shall be deemed adulterated if it contains any food
additives that are unsafe within the meaning of section 409. 161
Section 409 provides that a food additive is deemed unsafe
unless the additive and its use or intended use comply with a
properly promulgated food additive regulation. 6 2 The statute
defines the term food additive to mean any substance that is
intended for use in or which may be reasonably expected to become
a component of or otherwise affect the characteristics of any food,
provided the substance
is not generally recognized, among experts qualified by
scientific training and experience to evaluate its safety, as
having been adequately shown through scientific procedures
(or, in the case as a substance used in food prior to January 1,
1958, through either scientific procedures or experience based
on common use in food) to be safe under the conditions of its
intended use ....

163

Accordingly, commonly used natural substances that are added to
foods, such as spices, in addition to certain chemical additives, are
not considered food additives because they are considered to be
generally recognized as safe ("GRAS")." 4
In 1992, FDA published a policy statement on "foods derived
from new plant varieties."6 5 This policy provided guidance on how
FDA would treat GM foods in the regulatory process. The policy
included within the definition of "genetic modification" alterations of
the genotype that occurred using any technique, whether
166
conventional plant breeding or new biotechnology techniques.
Thus, under this definition, virtually all cultivated food crops were
considered to be genetically modified.'
This approach of treating
all cultivated food crops as genetically modified regardless of the
process used to modify them is consistent with the Coordinated
Framework stated policy choice of regulating products rather than
160. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-97 (2000). Pursuant to the Reorganization Plan No. 3
of 1970, FDA is responsible for the regulation of residues in food other than
pesticide residues, which are regulated by EPA. See supra notes 140-43 and
accompanying text.
161. 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(2)(C).
162. Id. § 348.
163. Id. § 321(s).
164. Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed.
Reg. 22,984, 22,989 (May 29, 1992).
165. Id. at 22,984.
166. Id. at 22,984 n.3.
167. Id.
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process. 68 However, the 1992 policy went further, establishing what
is in essence a presumptive GRAS status to GM foods as well as
conventionally bred foods.
This presumption was based on FDA's
conviction that, based on its experience, the likelihood of a
significant risk from a GM food is very low.1 7 0 FDA believed that the
traditional approach used by conventional crop breeders to insure
food safety has been successful in the past in identifying and
eliminating food crops that exhibited unexpected, adverse traits
prior to commercial use, and that such processes would sufficiently
screen out potentially risky GM foods . 7 ' The 1992 policy statement
explained that FDA believed that "[i]n most cases, the substances
expected to become components of food as a result of genetic
modification of a plant will be the same as or substantially similar
to substances commonly found in food, such as proteins, fats and
oils, and carbohydrates" and would thus qualify as GRAS. 172 FDA
did acknowledge that some GM foods would not qualify as GRAS,
including those that involve the transfer of gene coding for
substances that can cause allergenic responses in humans, those
that are known to be toxic, or those that are likely to become a
macroconstituent in the human or animal diet, thereby affecting the
nutritional value of GM foods. 73 FDA's position is, in essence, that
if the GM food is "substantially equivalent" to a food product already
in the human food supply with a history of safe use, the GM food
will, in the vast majority of cases, be safe, and therefore, no premarket evaluation of the safety of the GM food is necessary.171
Nevertheless, FDA leaves it up to the producer of the new plant
variety to determine the GRAS status of its product. 7' Thus, FDA's
approach to regulating GM foods is to establish a presumption of
safety and to leave it to the food producer, on a voluntary basis, to
determine whether it is necessary to seek out FDA review of the
safety of their product prior to introducing the product into the
market. This decision has been controversial, and in light of such
controversy, in 2001 FDA published proposed regulations that would

168. See Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed.
Reg. 23,302 (June 26, 1986).
169. Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed.
Reg. at 22,990.
170. Id. at 22,986-87.
171. Id. at 22,987.
172. Id. at 22,985.
173. Id. at 23,000.
174. For a full discussion of the substantial equivalency doctrine, see
generally McGarity, supra note 67.
175. Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed.
Reg. at 22,985.
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require manufacturers and importers of GM food to provide FDA
76
with pre-market notification of their intent to market GM foods.'
To date, FDA has not taken final action on this proposal.
Currently, FDA stands alone as the only federal agency
following the policy of the CoordinatedFramework to regulate based
on product rather than process. FDA's 1992 policy does not
distinguish based on the techniques used to produce the new plant
variety.
Instead, it relies on the standard of substantial
equivalency, which applies equally to conventionally bred plant
varieties and genetically engineered plant varieties. 177 As described
supra, the lack of even pre-market notification had been widely
criticized by those who believe that human health cannot be
adequately protected without at least some level of evaluation of
risk presented by new GM foods.
D.

USDA Authority
1.

GMOs Under the PlantProtectionAct

USDA's APHIS has authority to regulate GMOs pursuant to the
Plant Protection Act ("PPA")."78 The APHIS mandate under PPA is
to prevent the release and spread in the environment of "plant
pests," which are defined broadly as organisms that can directly or
indirectly injure or cause disease or damage in or to any plants or
plant parts. 179 In 1993, APHIS published a final rule amendment to
176. Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. 4706
(Jan. 18, 2001). In the January 2001 Federal Register, FDA proposed to require
the submission of data and information regarding plant-derived bioengineered
foods that would be consumed by humans or animals at least 120 days prior to
the commercial distribution of such foods. Id. FDA stated that it was proposing
this action to "ensure that it has the appropriate amount of information" and to
"permit the agency to assess on an ongoing basis whether plant-derived
bioengineered foods comply with the standards of the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act." Id.
In the Federal Register notice, FDA stated that the
scientific community generally supports the regulatory approach articulated in
FDA's 1992 policy, but that the proposal is a response to the many consumers,
public interest groups, and some state officials that have expressed concern
regarding the lack of a requirement for pre-market review. Id. at 4707.
However, to date, FDA has not published a final rule addressing pre-market
review.
177. Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed.
Reg. at 22,992.
178. 7 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7772 (2000).
The 2000 Plant Protection Act
consolidated the authorities of two previously existing statutes under which
APHIS asserted its regulatory jurisdiction over GMOs, the Federal Plant Pest
Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 150aa-150jj (1994), and the Plant Quarantine Act, 7 U.S.C. §§
151-164, 166-167 (1994).
179. 7 C.F.R. § 340.1 (2006).
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the regulations pertaining to the introduction of certain genetically
engineered organisms and products to provide for a notification
process prior to the introduction of certain GMOs."' APHIS also
amended the regulation to provide for a petition process allowing for
determination that certain GMOs are no longer considered
"regulated articles,""8 ' the term APHIS uses for GMOs that pose
potential plant pest risk. In the final rule, APHIS stated that it
believed, based on experience, these actions would relieve
unnecessary restrictions on the introduction of regulated articles." 2
The notification procedure is allowed for the introduction of
most GM plants that are considered regulated articles, provided
that the introduction is conducted in accordance with specified
eligibility requirements and performance standards.1 8 3 This would
alleviate the need to obtain a permit prior to the introduction of
those regulated articles. The stated rationale for replacing the
permitting process for most regulated articles with notification is
that APHIS believes that the notification process is sufficient for
many regulated articles, based on the considerable experience
APHIS gained in permitting GM plants since it established its
permitting process for regulated articles in 1987.184 APHIS stated
that it had issued over three hundred permits for field tests and

180. Genetically Engineered Organisms and Products, Final Rule, 58 Fed.
Reg. 17,044 (Mar. 31, 1993). The final rule was the outgrowth of a 1992
proposed rule. Genetically Engineered Organisms and Products, Proposed
Rule, 57 Fed. Reg. 53,036 (Nov. 6, 1992). The final rule followed the basic
design of the proposed rule, with some modifications based on comments
received.
181. Genetically Engineered Organisms and Products, Final Rule, 58 Fed.
Reg. at 17,044. The term "regulated article" is defined as
[any organism which has been altered or produced through genetic
engineering, if the donor organism, recipient organism, or vector or
vector agent belongs to any genera or taxa designated in § 340.2 and
meets the definition of plant pest, or is an unclassified organism
and/or an organism whose classification is unknown, or any product
which contains such an organism, or any other organism or product
altered or produced through genetic engineering which the
Administrator determines is a plant pest or has reason to believe is a
plant pest. Excluded are recipient microorganisms which are not
plant pests and which have resulted from the addition of genetic
material from a donor organism where the material is well
characterized and contains only non-coding regulatory regions.
7 C.F.R. § 340.1.
182. Genetically Engineered Organisms and Products, Final Rule, 58 Fed.
Reg. at 17,044-45.
183. Genetically Engineered Organisms and Products, Proposed Rule, 57
Fed. Reg. at 53,036-37.
184. Id. at 53,037.
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over one thousand permits for the movement of regulated articles.
Based on this experience, APHIS stated that it had determined that
introduction of many regulated articles86 can be conducted with little
or no plant pest or environmental risk.
For releases into the environment beyond controlled field
testing, APHIS adopted a final rule which established a process for
petitioning to determine nonregulated status.'8 7 For any organism
for which such a petition is granted, that organism is no longer
considered a "regulated article," and therefore is exempt from all
185. Id. By 2001, USDA had issued 1117 field test authorizations for more
than 57,000 acres of GM crop field testing. See Proposed Federal Actions to
Update Field Test Requirements for Biotechnology Derived Plants, 67 Fed. Reg.
50,578 (Aug. 2, 2002).
186. Genetically Engineered Organisms and Products, Proposed Rule, 57
Fed. Reg. at 53,037. To qualify for the notification process, six eligibility
requirements must be met: (1) the regulated article is one of a list of plants
species, which includes corn, cotton, potato, soybean, tobacco, and tomato, or
any additional plant species that APHIS has determined may be safely
introduced in accordance with the performance standards; (2) the introduced
genetic material is "stably integrated" in the plant genome; (3) the introduced
genetic material is well characterized and does not contain genes whose
expressions in the regulated article result in plant disease; (4) the introduced
genetic material does not cause the production of an infectious entity or result
in constituents that are new to the plant and are toxic to non-target organisms;
(5) the introduced genetic material does not pose a significant risk of the
creation of any new plant virus; and (6) the plant has not been modified to
contain functionally intact genes derived from human or animal pathogens. 7
C.F.R. § 340.3(b) (2006). The performance standards for introductions under
the notification procedure include a number of requirements designed to
prevent unintentional spread of the regulated article's genetic material in the
environment. Id. § 340.3(c). These requirements are geared toward containing
the spread of the organisms during field testing, but are not applicable to
commercial release of the organism into the environment. The performance
standard requirements specify: (1) that plants or plant materials be shipped in
such a way that the viable plant material is unlikely to be disseminated while
in transit; (2) that when released into the environment the regulated article
must be planted in such a way that it is not inadvertently mixed with nonregulated plant materials which are not part of the environmental release; (3)
that the plant and plant parts must be maintained in such way that the
identity of all material is known while it is in use, and that the plants parts
must be contained or devitalized when no longer in use; (4) that there must be
no viable vector agent associated with the regulated article; (5) that when there
is a significant probability that gene movement of the regulated article via
pollen will result in viable progeny persisting in the environment such
movement must be minimized; and (6) that upon termination of the field tests,
no viable material shall remain which is likely to volunteer in subsequent
seasons, or volunteers shall be managed to prevent persistence in the
environment. Id.
187. Id.
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The petitioner must supply certain data
APHIS regulation.'"
regarding the organism, including field test data. 88 APHIS then
reviews the data for potential "plant pest" risk.'9 ° Plant pest risk is
direct or indirect injury, damage to, or disease in any plant or plant
product.'' If APHIS determines the organism poses no plant pest
petition and the organism will be exempt from
risk, it will grant the
19 2
APHIS regulation.

As with EPA's GMO regulation to date, APHIS's regulations
focus on which GMOs require submission of notification prior to
field testing and which GMOs are completely exempt from APHIS
regulatory oversight. APHIS's regulations do not address how to
regulate GMOs that are released into the environment to minimize
environmental risk. Moreover, APHIS's focus on plant pest risk
does not adequately address the other types of unique risks that
may be posed by GMOs.

188. Id.
189. Id. § 340.6(c)(5).
190. A process for publication in the Federal Register and public comment is
provided. Id. § 340.6(d)(2).
191. The term "plant pest" means
any living stage of any of the following that can directly or indirectly
injure, cause damage to, or cause disease in any plant or plant
product:
(A) A protozoan.
(B) A nonhuman animal.
(C) A parasitic plant.
(D) A bacterium.
(E) A fungus.
(F) A virus or viroid.
(G) An infectious agent or other pathogen.
(H) Any article similar to or allied with any of the articles
specified in the preceding subparagraphs.
7 U.S.C. § 7702(14) (2000). Although the term "plant pest" is not defined to
include organisms that cause harm to human health or environmental health in
general, the 2000 PPA extended the authority of USDA to consider human
health and broad environmental harm. PPA gives USDA the authority to
prohibit or restrict the importation, exportation, and interstate movement of
plants, plant products, certain biological control agents, noxious weeds, and
plant pests. The term "noxious weed" means "any plant or plant product that
can directly or indirectly injure or cause damage to crops (including nursery
stock or plant products), livestock, poultry, or other interests of agriculture,
irrigation, navigation, the natural resources of the United States, the public
health, or the environment." Id. § 7702(10) (emphasis added).
192. 7 C.F.R. § 340.6(d) (2006). APHIS retains the authority to "reregulate"
the organisms if it becomes a plant pest in the future. Organisms exempt from
APHIS regulation may still be subject to EPA or FDA regulation.
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Non-indigenous Organisms Under the PPA

In addition to its regulations addressing GMOs, in 1995, under
the authority of PPA, APHIS published a proposed rule relating to
the introduction
of non-indigenous
organisms
into the
environment. 93
The proposal would establish comprehensive
regulations on the importation, interstate movement, and release
into the environment of certain non-indigenous organisms.19
APHIS believed this action was necessary because the plant pest
regulations under which the movement of certain non-indigenous
organisms was regulated at the time did not adequately address the
introduction of the non-indigenous organisms that may potentially
be plant pests. 95 The proposed regulations would "provide a means

193. Introduction of NonIndigenous Organisms, 60 Fed. Reg. 5288 (Jan. 26,
1995) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 335).
194.

Id.

195. Id. Exotic species are frequently called non-indigenous species. A
common definition for exotic species are those "plants and animals found
outside their usual habitats." David J. Bederman, International Control of
Marine 'Pollution' by Exotic Species, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 677, 678 (1991).

Historically, U.S. regulation of non-indigenous species has been limited to a few
federal acts which are limited in scope and effectiveness. See Eric Biber, Note,
Exploring Regulatory Options for Controlling the Introduction of NonIndigenous Species to the United States, 18 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 375, 396-405 (1999);
see also Daniel P. Larsen, Combating the Exotic Species Invasion: The Role of

Tort Liability, 5 DuKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 21, 34-36 (1995). In addition to PPA,
the Lacey Act prohibits the importation into the United States of any animal
species that are designated by the Secretary of the Interior as injurious to
human beings, to the interests of agriculture, horticulture, forestry, or to
wildlife. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-78 (2000); 18 U.S.C. § 42(a)(1) (2000). Similarly, the
previous iterations of the PPA, 7 U.S.C. §§ 147a, 149, 150aa-150jj (2000), the
Federal Noxious Weed Act of 1974, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2801-14 (2000), and the Federal
Seed Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1551-1610 (2000), regulated the importation of exotic
plant species. The current statutory system is inherently reactive. For
example, the Lacey Act requires the Secretary of the Interior to classify exotic
species as injurious once they have already been introduced to the particular
ecological environment. See Steven A. Wade, Stemming the Tide: A Plea for
New Exotic Species Legislation, 10 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 343, 345-53 (1995);

see also Biber, supra, at 398. As such, attempts to limit or eliminate the risks
posed by exotic species face a daunting task as the invasive species has already
established itself as a prevalent nuisance in the particular ecosystem. See
Larsen, supra, at 28. This approach, frequently labeled as the "dirty list"
method, places the burden on the Secretary to show that the particular species
is harmful before importation may be banned, thereby ensuring that the species
in question can establish itself before a coordinated federal response can
prevent the resulting damage in the species' new ecosystem. Id. Furthermore,
the Lacey Act only regulates intentional introductions of exotic species, which
would not include the accidental introduction of species such the zebra mussel,
which has caused some of the most significant ecological damage. Id. at 24-25,
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of screening certain non-indigenous organisms prior to their
introduction to determine the potential plant pest risk associated
with the particular introduction."'9 6
The pre-1995 regulations for non-indigenous organisms were
limited to the movement of known plant pests and did not address
the movement of non-indigenous organisms not previously known to
present a plant pest risk or the release of such organisms into the
environment. 197
A 1993 U.S. Congress Office of Technology
Assessment ("OTA") report cited the loss of billions of dollars due to
the negative affects of certain non-indigenous organisms and
suggested that APHIS should revise its regulation to more
adequately address such risk. 9 ' Accordingly, under the 1995
proposed regulations, persons wishing to import or move interstate
a regulated non-indigenous organisms would be required to obtain a
permit from APHIS. 199 Under the proposal, a regulated organism of
concern would fall into one of the following categories: (1) an
organism of foreign origin that is not present in the United States;
(2) an organism of foreign origin that is present in the United States
but is capable of further expansion beyond its present established
range; and (3) an organism of foreign origin that has reached its full
range of potential establishment in the United States but is
sufficiently biologically different from the organism that is present
in the United States to warrant concern.200
The new regulation also proposes data requirements to assess
the plant pest and environmental risks involved in a proposed
introduction. Information required to be provided as part of the

29. While currently the Lacey Act only addresses intentionally introduced
exotic species, authors proposing legislative reform have argued for including
high-risk activities likely to lead to the introduction of exotic species. See Biber,
supra, at 440. Legislative reform predicated on a "clean list approach" would
place the burden on the introducer of the exotic species to show that the new
species would not negatively affect the ecosystem. Id. In conjunction with the
burden-shifting, further legislative reforms could include imposition of a strict
liability standard for the release of any exotic species akin to the
Comprehensive, Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
("CERCLA"). Id. at 427-28 (noting, however, that such a strict liability
standard should retain more flexibility than the CERCLA model so that
insurance plans may be utilized to avoid the litigiousness inherent in CERCLA
matters); see also Larsen, supra, at 36-38.
196. Introduction of NonIndigenous Organisms, 60 Fed. Reg. at 5288.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 5288-89.
199. Id. at 5290. As part of its permit review process APHIS would be
required to seek input of appropriate state agencies as well as other federal
agencies such as the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and EPA. Id. at 5291.
200. Id. at 5291-92.
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permitting process would include a description of the life cycle,
biology, and ecology of the regulated organism.2 °' In addition,
information must be provided on whether the regulated organism
has been genetically modified, and if so, a description of the genetic
modification must be provided.2 °2 If the regulated organism has
been genetically modified through sexual recombination and
selection for traits not typical of the organism in nature, through
induced mutation and selection for special traits, or other classical
techniques, APHIS would require "a description of the modification
in order to assess the biology of the modified regulated organism
insofar as it differs from that of an unmodified organism of the same
species."20 3 If, on the other hand, recombinant DNA techniques have
been used to affect the modification, the permit application would be
handled under the regulations for the GMOs.0 4 Other information
that must be provided includes information on the geographic
location where the regulated organism was originally collected and
information on the established range of the regulated organism in
the United States.2 5
Permits for the release of a regulated organism into the
environment would require more information to support a permit
than the permits involving importation or interstate movement with
no intended release into the environment.2 6 For release permits,
information must be provided regarding all testing and reviews that
have been conducted to assess the effects of the regulated organism
on the environment in its established range, and the host specificity
of the regulated organism under both artificial and natural
conditions.207 If APHIS issues a permit, the permit would specify the
applicable conditions for the introduction of the regulated
organism. 20 The proposal also provides a process for obtaining an
exemption from regulation for organisms that are determined not to

201. Id. at 5292.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. In addition, the permit applicant must submit detailed information
on the procedures, processes, and safeguards that will be used at the
destination facility to prevent the escape and dissemination of the regulated
organism and any material accompanying the regulated organism for a permit
involving either the importation or interstate movement of a regulated
organism: Id. at 5293.
206. Id. at 5294.
207. Id.
208. Id.
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pose a significant plant pest risk.20 9 To date, APHIS has not issued a
final rule.
V.

THE NEED FOR A REEVALUATION

In the 1980s and 1990s, when the U.S. regulatory agencies were
first tasked with developing regulatory approaches to GMOs, they
were working in a vacuum attempting to determine where GMOs fit
into existing regulatory programs, what agencies had existing
relevant jurisdiction, and what aspects of GMOs were subject to
regulation under existing statutory schemes. The clear direction,
dating back to the 1986 CoordinatedFramework,was that no new or
additional statutory authority was required, and that GMOs would
be regulated under the existing patchwork of statutes into which
GMOs could be shoehorned. Moreover, early attempts to regulate
GMOs sought to follow the constraints of what now appears to be
the misguided U.S. policy that regulation should be based on the
characteristics of the product, rather than the process by which the
product was produced.
With the experiences gleaned over the past twenty years, we
now know that some of the problems caused by GMOs differ not just
in extent but also in type from those posed by traditional chemicals.
Well-known examples include the potential allergens in StarLink
corn that have been distributed throughout the world, the dramatic
acceleration of pest resistance to the natural insecticide Bt, potential
risks to monarch butterflies caused by exposure to Bt pollen, crossfertilization of neighboring farms resulting in loss of organic
certification, and the prospect of superweeds that cannot be easily
eliminated.210 As can be seen from the description supra Part IV of
current U.S. regulation of GMOs, the decision to rely on three
agencies operating under at least three different statutes with
overlapping jurisdiction, none designed with GMOs as a primary
focus, has resulted in haphazard and incomplete regulatory policy
with no clearly identifiable overriding guiding principle for
regulating the risks of GMOs. 21 ' Although the three agencies do
209. Id. at 5295.
210. See supra notes 19-27 and accompanying text.
211. Interestingly, although the controversy over the regulation of GMOs
has raged for over twenty years, in that time, very few cases have been litigated
involving issues related to GMOs. Some of the few cases litigated include: Int'l
Ctr. for Tech. Assessment v. Thompson, 421 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2006)
(upholding FDA's decision to allow unregulated commercialization of a
genetically engineered ornamental fish); In re StarLink Corn Prods. Liab. Litig.,
212 F. Supp. 2d 828 (N.D. Ill. 2002); Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F.
Supp. 2d 166 (D.D.C. 2000) (finding that FDA's 1992 policy statement on GM
foods was not arbitrary or capricious); Found. on Econ. Trends v. Thomas, 661
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consider many of the types of risks described in this Article, they do
not adequately address the unique degree of exposure potential and
the unique evolutionary impacts GMOs may have. Moreover, the
agencies regulate in a piecemeal fashion with no clear standards to
guide their decisions on whether a GMO should be permitted to be
released into the environment. For example, EPA regulates GMOs
under the cost-benefit standards of FIFRA and TSCA.212 Thus,
under such an analysis, a GMO that is believed to have significant
economic benefits may be permitted to be released without a full
understanding of the potential, novel risks it may pose. As
discussed supra, EPA does not have data requirements specific to
GMOs and is severely constrained by having labeling restrictions as
the primary risk reduction tool available under FIFRA.213
Currently, EPA's approach to GM microbial pesticides is to
require notification and submission of data prior to small-scale
testing of microbials whose genetic material has been deliberately
modified. However, EPA does not have clear standards for deciding
whether to register GM microbial pesticides or how to regulate them
to adequately address their unique attributes. With regard to PIPs,
EPA's approach is to regulate GM PIPs on a case-by-case ad hoc
basis without any established data requirements, labeling
requirements, or other regulations. 214 As to non-pesticidal GM
microbes, EPA has drawn the regulatory threshold at intergeneric
organisms and requires premanufacture notification and data
submission for such organisms. 215

Again, however, EPA has not

established a comprehensive regulatory approach for determining
which organisms to allow to be commercialized or how to reduce
such risks from the commercialization of such products. Under
USDA/APHIS regulations, the focus is on plant pest risk, which does
not address the full range of risks of GMOs.21 6 Moreover, USDA's
approach is focused on deregulating GMOs.21 7
The evaluation of pesticidal GM foods appears to be the one
area with an appropriately clear standard governing when a GM
food should be permitted. Under the 1996 Food Quality Protection
Act, 2'8 FFDCA was amended to include a "safety" standard for
F. Supp 713 (D.D.C. 1986) (dismissing for failure to present a justiciable case or
controversy a suit seeking an order requiring EPA to modify the procedures
under which it authorizes the release of GM pesticides into the environment).
212. See supra notes 86, 158 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 138, 87-90 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 152-56 and accompanying text.
216. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
217. See supra note 178-92 and accompanying text.
218. 1996 Food Quality Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110 Stat. 1489
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pesticide residues in food, which requires reasonable certainty that
no harm will result from aggregate exposure to the pesticide
chemical residue, including all anticipated dietary exposures and all
other exposures for which there is reliable information. 2 ' 9 Thus, as
to pesticidal GM foods, EPA at least has a clear risk-based standard
to guide its decisionmaking.
For non-pesticidal GM foods, on the other hand, FDA has not
required any premarket notification or data submission, and instead
presumes that most GM foods are substantially similar to foods
already consumed by humans and animals and leaves it to the
producer to determine whether testing or further evaluation are
indicated. Accordingly, the vast majority of GM foods do not
undergo formal agency review prior to becoming part of the human
food supply. 2 °

Consequently, a rethinking of U.S. GMO policy is

warranted.
Because GMOs reflect human tinkering with the
evolutionary process, evolutionary biology theory may assist in
crafting a new approach to regulating GMOs.
Two recent scientific studies highlight the shortcomings of U.S.
GMO policy and regulation. In 2002, the National Academy of
Sciences, National Research Council ("NRC") published a report
evaluating the regulation of transgenic plants. 22' The NRC report
reaches some unanticipated conclusions regarding the risks of
transgenic plants. The conventional wisdom prior to the issuance of
the report was that the impact of the deliberate release of biological
novelty, whether through conventional breeding or genetic
modification, could be measured in two ways: (1) the number of
genetic changes, and (2) the taxonomic or phylogenetic distance
between the source and the recipient.22 2 Historically, there was an
assumption that the greater the novelty of the introduced species
the greater the potential environmental risk associated with such
novelty. The NRC report shows that this is not necessarily the case.
(codified in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (2000)).
219. 21 U.S.C. § 346a(c)(2)(A) (2000).
220. See supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
221. COMM. ON ENVTL. IMPACTS ASSOCIATED WITH COMMERCIALIZATION OF
TRANSGENIC PLANTS, BOARD ON AGRIC. AND NATURAL RES., Div. ON EARTH AND
LIFE STUDIES, NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF TRANSGENIC

PLANTS: THE SCOPE AND ADEQUACY OF REGULATION (2002) [hereinafter NRC
REPORT].
The NRC report was in response to a 2000 request from USDA

requesting that the National Academy of Sciences examine the scientific basis
for an operation of APHIS regulatory oversight of transgenic plants. Previous
NRC committees have examined other issues related to the safety of genetically
modified organisms, but none of the previous reports specifically address
APHIS oversights or how commercial use of GM crops with non-pesticidal traits
could affect agricultural and non-agricultural environments. Id. at 48-49.
222. Id. at 28-30.
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Specifically, the NRC report concludes (1) that changes at any level
of genetic information can have profound environmental
consequences, (2) that the consequence of biological novelty depends
strongly on the specific environment into which the organism is
released, (3) that the significance of the consequences of the
introduction of novelty depends on societal values, (4) that the
introduction of any type of biological novelty can have unintended
and unpredicted effects on recipient communities and ecosystems,
and (5) that it is not possible to quantitatively differentiate the
genetic environmental risk associated with the release of
conventionally bred crop cultivars and the introduction of new GM
223
species.
Perhaps most significantly, the NRC report in essence rejects
the Coordinated Framework approach of regulating the
characteristics of the product rather the process by which the
product is created. Specifically, the NRC concluded that genetic
engineering can "introduce specific traits or combination of traits
that pose unique risks."224
Moreover, in evaluating APHIS
regulatory program for GMOs, the NRC report concludes that with
regard to APHIS petitioning process, it is imperative that once 225
a
petition is granted there be further monitoring and oversight.
Further, the report identifies the treatment of non-target effects and
pesticides resistance as superficial and accordingly recommends
that APHIS should increase the rigors of its environmental
assessments or completely defer to EPA on these issues. 226 The
in
postreport
strongly
recommends
improvements
commercialization testing and monitoring of transgenic plants.227
Specifically, two different types of ecological monitoring to assess
anticipated or long-term incremental environmental impacts are
suggested. 228 The first would include a network of trained observers
to detect unusual changes in agricultural and unmanaged
ecosystems. 229 The second recommendation is for the establishment
of a long-term monitoring program that examines planting patterns
and uses a subset of species and abiotic parameters as indicators of
long-term shifts in an ecosystem.2 °
223.
224.
225.
public
168.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

See generally id.
Id. at 48.
Id. at 120. Moreover, the report recommends more opportunities for
participation and enhanced peer review in the petitioning process. Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 178-79.
at 192-219.
at 205.
at 205-07.
at 205-13.

Moreover, the NRC report notes that the ability of
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Although the NRC report is focused primarily on APHIS
regulation, EPA's proposal to exempt from FIFRA regulation all
pesticidal PIPs, which receive genetic material from a sexually
compatible plant regardless of whether the PIP was produced by
genetic engineering or conventional breeding,
is not consistent
with the scientific findings of the NRC report. The report rejects the
idea that the ecological risks are higher when a gene is moved
between organisms that are not closely related as opposed to
movement
of the gene between closely related or sexually compatible
•
232
organisms.
EPA's focus on sexual compatibility may have some
validity from the standpoint of protecting human beings from
dietary risks associated with GM foods. For example, moving a gene
between closely related or sexually compatible organisms may
ensure the types of substances that human beings are exposed to in
their diet does not significantly change. If a gene is moved from one
variety of corn to another related variety of corn, the chance of the
genetic modification resulting in significant new exposures to
humans is relatively low. However, in evaluating ecological risks
NRC has found that the same analysis does not hold true, and in
fact, the movement of genes between closely related organisms can
result in the same type and magnitude of ecological risks as moving
genes between unrelated organisms. 2"

The primary factor in

determining the ecological risks associated with the release of the
GMO into the environment is the specific environment into which
the GMO is released and how such environment is able to handle
the new organism.
The second significant recent scientific analysis is the 2005 EPA
SAP consideration of the risks of PIPs based on virus coat protein
genes. 234 A meeting was held to enable SAP to consider the scientific
issues associated with EPA's proposed exemption of certain PIPs
that • •had
genetically modified to be resistant to viral
'
231 been
infection.
SAP evaluated a number of potential risks associated
with these PIPs, including the risk of out-crossing with wild
relatives and the risk of the PIP itself becoming weedy. 236 SAP
recommended a set of criteria to evaluate species in order to help
APHIS to monitor is hampered by the lack of baseline and comparative data on
environmental impacts of previous agricultural practices. Id. at 201.
231. See supra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
232. NRC REPORT, supra note 221, at 36-43.
233. Id. at 49.
234. SAP REPORT, supra note 45.
235. EPA first proposed exempting certain PIPs that had been genetically
engineered to be resistant to viral infection in its 1994 proposed rule. See supra
note 126.
236. SAP REPORT, supra note 45, at 11.
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determine the likelihood of such events occurring, and it evaluated
biological containment and mitigation methods as a potential means
for ensuring that the PIP does not out-cross with wild relatives.23 7
The SAP report contains the type of science-based criteria that could
form the basis of a new comprehensive approach to regulating
certain nontraditional risks from GMOs.238
In addition to these recent scientific evaluations, a number of
legal scholars have evaluated various aspects of U.S. regulation of
GMOs and have concluded that there are significant shortcomings.
Many of these scholars have concluded that the United States
should abandon its policy of relying on existing legal authorities in
favor of a new overriding genetic engineering statute that would
eliminate many of the regulatory gaps, overlaps, and inconsistencies
that currently exist. 239 However, these scholars have not articulated

237.

Id.

238. See generally SAP REPORT, supra note 45.
239. Legal scholars have also evaluated a number of nonregulatory
approaches for addressing GMOs. Some commentators have expressed the view
that federal regulation of GMOs is not needed at all. The basis for this
argument is the belief that the private sector can adequately police itself and
ensure that GMOs that are likely to cause human health or environmental
problems are not commercially available. However, as can be seen from recent
events such as with StarLink corn, the biotech industry has not demonstrated
its ability to adequately screen for or control GMOs. In addition, some scholars
have evaluated the effectiveness of a variety of common law remedies for
addressing potential harms from GMOs. However, none of these theories
appear to be adequate. For example, the basis of the theory of strict liability is
that the product has a defect that renders it unreasonably dangerous, thereby
creating a duty to warn consumers of the danger. However, in order to warn, a
manufacturer of a GMO must be able to predict what potential future problems
may be. Also, warning a consumer is not a sufficient guard against harm.
Although the consumer may be able to heed a warning, once the GMO is
released in to the environment where it can reproduce and spread, a warning to
a consumer will have no effect. Similarly, under negligence theory it must be
established that the manufacturer or supplier breached its duty to a foreseeable
plaintiff by failing to act in a reasonable manner. However, damages for
negligence are not an adequate remedy because once the GMOs are reproducing
and spreading in the environment, there may be no way to control them.
Pursuant to a theory of breach of warranty, plaintiffs need to establish that
when the defendant sold the product, the defendant made express or implied
warranties and the product did not conform to these warranties. The product
does not need to be unreasonably dangerous. Breach of warranty is unlikely to
be used with regard to GMOs because due to the inherent unpredictability of
GMOs, manufacturers will be reluctant to offer or imply warranties. Finally,
common law nuisance law may not be adequate. Once a GMO is released,
payment of damages may not be adequate because damages will continue to
occur as the organism reproduces and moves through the environment. There
may be no way to ever "recall" the GMO as you could with a traditional
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a clear overriding regulatory standard or decisionmaking approach
that could be incorporated into such a statute and could apply to the
regulation of all GMOs.24 °
Perhaps two of the most significant scholars addressing legal
responses to the risks of GMOs are Professors Thomas 0. McGarity
and Gregory N. Mandel. Professor McGarity's article focuses on the
human risks associated with the consumption of GM foods. 24'

He

analyzes how
the
in the law and shows
... equivalency"
242
proen
tuse
ha oft "substantial
be
how it has proven to be ineffective.
Professor Mandel's article, on
the other hand, looks at the adequacy of existing laws in addressing
the environmental risks of GMOs released into the environment in
the context of the 2002 NRC report.243 Mandel, drawing on the
regulatory gaps and shortcomings identified in the NRC244 report,
suggests wayssuggsts
to improve
the lawto
law to better
address
risks
rsiss.
iproe aysto th
ette ad

While

chemical product.
See Kunich, supra note 5, at 835-40 (describing the
difficulties of containing inherently mobile organisms through traditional
regulatory approaches).
240. For example, one legal scholar has proposed an alternative new statute,
"Transgenic Release Act" ("TRA"), to be administered by EPA and to be the only
federal statute regulating the environmental effects of genetically engineered
organisms.
Under TRA, there would be an EPA-maintained register of
transgenic organisms and a center for transgenic research and testing. TRA
would not require pre-release testing or certification. Administrative penalties
would be available to cover clean-up costs. Id. at 859-69.
241. McGarity, supra note 67.
242. A full discussion of the potential human health risks associated with
genetically modified foods and FDA's regulation of such risks is beyond the
scope of this article. For an excellent discussion of these matters, see id. In his
article Professor McGarity evaluates FDA's approach to GM foods and focuses
on the role that the substantial equivalence doctrine has played in such
regulation. Professor McGarity concludes that the substantial equivalence
doctrine is not adequate to ensure food safety and instead suggests a more
precautionary approach be taken in regulating genetically modified foods. Most
significantly, he proposes that prerelease notification should be required to
provide FDA with an opportunity to review GM foods prior to
commercialization. Id. at 476-77. He also proposes requiring additional data
collection, data evaluation, risk assessment, and monitoring and enforcement.
Id. at 481, 485.
243. Gregory N. Mandel, Gaps, Inexperience, Inconsistencies, and Overlaps:
Crisis in the Regulation of Genetically Modified Plants and Animals, 45 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 2167 (2004).
244. Some of the regulatory gaps that Professor Mandel identifies include:
(1) EPA does not yet regulate transgenic animals, such as salmon; (2) EPA has
not yet begun to evaluate transgenic plants that produce pharmaceuticals or
industrial products, or transgenic plants that are drought tolerant, salinity
tolerant, or virus resistant; (3) "APHIS does not conduct environmental
assessments of transgenic plants submitted through the notification process;"
(4) APHIS's environmental risk assessment has been criticized by NRC for
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both of these pieces are important contributions to the legal
discourse on regulating GMOs, this Article suggests a broader lens
through which reform of GMO regulation can benefit. By using
evolutionary biology, this Article builds on the work of previous
scholars and demonstrates that the regulation of living organisms
must go beyond traditional approaches to regulating human
behavior by considering the behavior of the organisms themselves.
VI.

EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY

In 1982, Professor William H. Rodgers, Jr. called upon his
colleagues
to 1bring
envirnmenal
245

people

back

into

the

legal

analysis

of

environmental law.
It is now time for a call to bring biology back
into the analysis.246 The conventional wisdom is that "[1]aw deals in
human behavior."247 While this may be true in the vast majority of

lacking scientific rigor, balance, and transparency, and for relying too heavily
on existing scientific literature rather than requiring the development of new
experimental data; (5) once APHIS grants a petition for nonregulated status, it
no longer has any authority over the GMO or its progeny; (6) FDA does not
require pre-market notification; and (7) APHIS requirements about
environmental release prevention do not address release or path of pollen. Id.
at 2230-34. Professor Mandel argues that many of the existing shortcomings
can be attributed to the reliance on statutes that predate the advent of GM
technology. Id. at 2172. To address these concerns, he proposes that statutory
and regulatory structures should be revised to overhaul the division of
regulatory responsibility. Id. at 2246-51.
245. William H. Rodgers, Jr., Bringing People Back: Toward a
Comprehensive Theory of Taking in Natural Resources Law, 10 ECOLOGY L.Q.
205, 206 (1982).
246. As a general matter, the relationship between law and science has been
an uneasy one. Although science intersects with virtually all areas of law,
practitioners of the two disciplines do not seem to relate well. Many areas of
law, including medical malpractice, patent law, and environmental law, rely
heavily on scientific evidence to prove individual cases; however, it seems that
scientific knowledge has not been used as effectively to inform policy choices in
these areas of the law. See Robert J. Condlin, "What's Really Going On?" A
Study of Lawyer and Scientist Inter-Disciplinary Discourse, 25 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 181 (1999).
For additional discussion of the
relationship between law and science, particularly in the environmental arena,
see SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY IN
AMERICA (1995); Susan Haack, Trial and Error: The Supreme Court's
Philosophy of Science, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, S66 (2005); Wendy E. Wagner,
The "Bad Science" Fiction: Reclaiming the Debate over the Role of Science in
Public Health and Environmental Regulation, 66 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63
(2003); Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 1613 (1995).
247. Owen D. Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law: An Introduction and
Application to Child Abuse, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1117, 1241 (1997) ("Every legal
regime . . . inescapably reflects some behavioral model purporting to draw
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legal contexts, in certain areas law may need to look beyond human
behavior and extend its reach to address the behavior of other living
organisms. Nowhere is this more true than where the law attempts
to address disruptions to ecological systems by living organisms,
whether genetically modified or non-indigenous.
A regulatory
regime that stops at considering human behavior may make sense,
for example, in addressing risks from the release of a particular
chemical substance into the environment as a result of human
behavior. In this context, the social value of the human behavior
that results in the release can be considered along with the risks
posed by the chemical. Once it is determined that the release of a
certain amount of the chemical is acceptable, the only concern is
how to restrict the human behavior to achieve that goal. Regulatory
restrictions that change or limit the human behavior that ultimately
presents the risk can be imposed and the risk will be reduced to the
desired level.
With living organisms, however, the law must not limit itself to
considering human behavior. By their very nature, living organisms
can spread and reproduce in the environment. Moreover, living
organisms may be able to out-compete other species or cause
disruptions to ecological systems.
Simply controlling human
behavior, short of outright banning the release of such organisms,
will not permit an effective response to many of the potential risks
posed by such organisms. Accordingly, when designing a system to
address the risks posed by living organisms, the law should not limit
its inquiry to considering how human beings handle the living
organisms.
In other words, with regard to certain GMOs,
environmental harms cannot solely be prevented by a legal system
that strives only to control human behavior. Instead, the law must
look further and ask how the organisms themselves are likely to
behave once they are released into the environment. Evolutionary
biology theory may be useful not only in predicting the behavior of
living organisms, but also in designing• 2481
regulatory systems to
address the risks posed by the organisms.
With a reasonable
understanding of the organisms' likely behavior, the law can be
tailored to address potential risks resulting from such behaviors.
causal arrows between supposed influences and law-relevant behavior.").
248. One of the few attempts to apply evolutionary biology theory to the
regulation of nonhuman living organisms was a 2000 student note applying the
theory to biotechnology patent law. Through an evolutionary biology analysis,
the author proposed that patents be granted only on those "non-naturally
occurring [organisms] whose prospects for continued existence are predicated
not upon their selection by nature, but upon their selection by people." Ryan

M.T. Iwasaka, Note, From Chakrabarty to Chimeras: The Growing Need for
Evolutionary Biology in Patent Law, 109 YALE L.J. 1505, 1510 (2000).
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Ironically, evolutionary biology theory has not been used widely
in environmental law.
It may seem obvious that if the principles
of evolutionary biology and ecology belong anywhere in the legal
world it should be in the world of environmental law, but until
recently environmental law has been somewhat divorced from such
considerations.
Environmental law has concerned itself with
regulating the behaviors of people and business entities and with
minimizing releases of hazardous substances and wastes to the air,
water, and land. This approach may work with regard to toxic
chemical or pollution control, but with the ever increasing
development of new technologies involving living organisms, and the
increased risks of environmental harms caused by these new living
organisms, it is now evident that even settled environmental law
has largely bypassed the mission of protecting natural systems from
the novel risks associated with GMOs.
A.

Evolutionary Biology Theory

Although frequently used in popular parlance to suggest some
type of predetermined path from simple to complex, the concept of
evolution from a biological standpoint is quite simply the process by
which change occurs as traits are passed from one generation to the
next. Of course, in the early twenty-first century, virtually every
schoolchild is aware that such traits are passed from parent to
offspring via the transmission of genetic information contained in
the DNA.25 °
In nature, periodic random mutations of DNA result in
variation occurring among the members of a species.
Some
variations are more advantageous to survival than others in a
particular environment. Individuals that possess the advantageous
traits are more likely to survive and pass their genes on to the next
generation. 5 For evolution to occur, three factors must be present:
(1) variation (caused by mutations in DNA) in the physical and

249. See William H. Rodgers, Jr., Where Environmental Law and Biology
Meet: Of Panda'sThumbs, Statutory Sleepers, and Effective Law, 65 U. COLO. L.
REV. 25 (1993).

250. Long before the discovery of DNA by Watson and Crick in the 1950s, for
which they were awarded the 1962 Nobel Prize, scientists understood that
traits were passed from one generation to the next without understanding the
precise biological mechanism for the transmission of such traits.
251. Of course, simply because an organism is more likely to survive than its
peers does not necessarily mean that it will be more likely to pass on its genetic
material to its offspring. This depends on that organism's ability to mate and
reproduce. The ability to mate and reproduce is the subject of a theory related
to the theory of "natural selection," which is referred to as "sexual selection."
For a description of sexual selection, see infra note 255 and accompanying text.
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behavioral traits possessed by individuals within a species; (2)
heredity-that is, the ability to pass genetic information, including
mutated genetic information, necessary for physical or behavioral
traits from parent to offspring; and (3) differential reproductionthe tendency of some inherited traits to survive in the gene pool
more than others.252 Differential reproduction is the result of
selective pressures that favor some mutations over others, thereby
enabling certain organisms to reproduce and limiting the ability of
other organisms to reproduce. Because evolution results from the
combined effect of these three factors, only the genetic mutations
that are favored under the selective pressures of the environment
survive in the long term.
The theory of natural selection, first described by Charles
Darwin in 1859,253 states that individuals that have certain traits
that confer an advantage to their survival in a particular
environment will be more likely to survive (more "fit" from an
evolutionary standpoint) and pass the genetic information that leads
to such advantageous traits on to their offspring.254 Individuals who
do not possess such advantageous traits will be less likely to survive
and reproduce, and, accordingly, their genetic material is less likely
to be passed on to future generations. In this way, over many
generations, the traits that are more advantageous become more
dominant in the populations.
A related, but very different theory, is that of sexual selection.
This theory, rather than focusing on an individual's general ability
to survive, focuses on an individual's ability to attract mates,
If an individual
successfully mate, and therefore reproduce.5
possesses traits that make him or her more likely to be able to
252. For a more thorough description of evolutionary biology, see Jones,
supra note 247, at 1129-55.
253.

CHARLES DARWIN, ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES BY MEANS OF NATURAL

SELECTION (Special ed., Gryphon Editions 1987) (1859). Although the phrase

"the survival of the fittest" is often cited in association with reference to Charles
Darwin, in fact, Darwin never uttered those words. The phrase was coined by
Herbert Spencer in 1862. Paul Elliott, Erasmus Darwin, Herbert Spencer, and
the Origins of the Evolutionary Worldview in British Provincial Scientific

Culture, 1770-1850, 94 Isis 1, 24 (2003). Unfortunately, the term is probably
responsible for the general misunderstanding of evolutionary biology that
permeates modern culture. Suggesting that some organisms are more "fit" for
survival implies that there is some absolute notion of a specific combination of
traits conferring the most "fitness." In all likelihood there are unlimited
combinations of traits that may confer fitness to a particular environment.
Moreover, "fitness" is not static. As environmental pressures change, the traits
that will confer fitness also change.
254. See DARWIN, supra note 253, at 470-71.
255. Id. at 87-90.
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obtain a suitable mate, that individual's genetic material will more
likely be passed on than will that of an individual who does not
possess such a trait. In the natural world, traits that make an
individual more attractive to potential mates may include traits
such as large size, robustness, and health-obvious traits that would
increase the odds of survival of offspring who inherit such traits
from their parents. What is more fascinating to human observers,
however, is the spectacular array of "attractiveness" traits that have
evolved in nature, the function of which appears to be solely to lure
mates. Such traits include vivid coloration, flashy plumage, and
elaborate dances and rituals.256
In recent years, evolutionary biology theory has undergone its
own evolution.
The conventional wisdom that evolutionary
processes follow a steady, stable pathway has been rejected in favor
of a notion of life on earth "in jittery motion ...

ready to dart off in

an instant."2 57 In other words, evolution is now believed to occur in
fits and spurts rather than in a slow, steady progression. Such
evolutionary spurts occur in response to environmental pressure
and may be more pronounced in response to environmental
pressures that are novel or atypical to a geographic locale, such as
the quick onset of a severe drought or flood in an area that typically
does not experience such extremes. 2 " The new understanding of
evolutionary biology suggests significant potential implications in
the area of the release of GMOs into the environment.
If
introducing novel environmental pressure can result in spurts of
evolution, perhaps introducing novel organisms into the existing
environment could have similar dramatic effects.
B.

Law and Biology
One area of legal scholarship that has incorporated evolutionary
biology theory is the field of "Law and Biology."2"9 The field of Law
and Biology, largely developed by Margaret Gruter and her
colleagues at the Gruter Institute, has been described as an attempt

256. Id. Of course, sexual attractiveness in humans is not without its own
set of peculiar traits, such as wealth, expensive cars, fashionable clothing, and
fashion magazine-worthy body types.
257. WEINER, supra note 34, at 112.
258. This new understanding of evolution in nature is related to the "new
ecology," which rejects the balance of nature in favor of a more dynamic view of
ecological processes. See generally DANIEL B. BOTKIN, DISCORDANT HARMONIES:
A NEW ECOLOGY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1990); Judy L. Meyer, The
Dance of Nature: New Concepts in Ecology, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 875 (1994).
259. The movement was called "Law and Biology" to emphasize its relation
to the "Law and Economics" movement. E. Donald Elliott, Law and Biology:
The New Synthesis?, 41 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 595, 596-97 (1997).
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to "use the insights of modern biology, particularly the features
about the distribution and proliferation of characteristics within
populations, and insights into behavioral factors like the evolution of
cooperation, in studying law." 260 Law and Biology theory states that
any system that exhibits the three features of reproduction,
variation, and selection by the environment will evolve in the
direction of greater fitness with the environment.
The
"environment" for law is the larger community: the political culture
and values of the community in which the law takes place. 26' Legal
precedent is the "reproduction" of law, both in terms of precedent in
the case law and the perpetuation of similar statutory schemes
through copying and basing one statute on previous statutes.
With regard to GMOs, the law must evolve to address this
newly evolved set of risks. In evolutionary terms, the "selective
pressure" that will drive this change is the intense public concern,
both in the United States and abroad, regarding the risks of GMOs.
The only element missing to complete the trio of evolutionary
prerequisites to dramatic legal evolution is the variation, or the
mutations. In the law, this can only come into being as a new idea.
Just as in biological evolution most new changes turn out to be bad
or neutral, for the law to evolve there must be a variety of new ideas
from which the selective pressures of public concern can hit on the
right one. To date, the vast majority of attempts to regulate GMOs
have merely been a proliferation of old models. These old models do
not work for GMOs. There is a natural evolution of biology and law.
Biological organisms evolve in accordance with principles of
evolutionary biology-essentially Darwinian natural selection.
This Article proposes that there is a way to use evolutionary
biology theory that has been largely ignored by the legal community:
using biological models to design legal systems aimed at
environmental
protection more effectively by incorporating
consideration of the evolutionary impacts of biological organismsor the raw materials that we are working with in an environmental

260. Id. at 599.
261. E. Donald Elliot describes three ways in which biological models and
insights have been used in the Law and Biology movement. The first is the use
of biological models to describe the dynamics of legal systems-i.e., how law
works by analogy to other complex systems. The second is to help develop a
natural law basis for law through a better understanding of how and why
humans are the way they are, particularly in comparison to other animals and
particularly in terms of operation or aggressive behavior in groups. The third is
to provide insight into how we can design legal systems more effectively. If we
have a better understanding of human nature-of the raw materials that we
are working with in a legal system-then perhaps we can design laws to work
more effectively. Id. at 600-12.
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legal system-to more effectively design a system that addresses the
novel risks posed by human intervention in these biological
processes.
In recent years, a number of legal scholars have begun to look to
evolutionary biology theory for insights into human social behavior
in the hopes that such insights may provide direction for legal
reforms.262 This area of scholarship is based on the scientific
recognition that natural selection affects both genetically
Accordingly,
determined physical and behavioral traits.263
evolutionary biology may play a predictive role in evaluating what
types of human behavior are likely to occur in given
circumstances.264
Recently, evolutionary biology theory has been studied as a way
to understand human behavior, including socially abhorrent
behavior, such as rape265 and child abuse.266 Although some scholars,
262. See supranote 259 and infra notes 264-68 and accompanying text.
263. In 1975, biologist Edward 0. Wilson's book, Sociobiology, first
introduced the idea that selective forces act on genetic behavioral traits,

including in humans, in addition to physical traits. See

WILSON, SOCIOBIOLOGY,

supra note 10. From 1975 until the late 1980s and early 1990s, scholars and
the public alike expressed extreme discomfort with applying this theory to
human behavior. In the ensuing years, scholars have refined the theory and in
its current iteration, it is more socially acceptable. See, e.g., Owen D. Jones,
Law and Evolutionary Biology: Obstacles and Opportunities, 10 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 265 (1994). Scholars are now careful to point out that
evolutionary biology theory should not be used to argue that simply because a
behavior is evolutionarily adaptive, such behavior must be allowed or
encouraged.
Instead, scholars now make clear that evolutionary biology
theory's major limitation is its lack of incorporation of normative values. Thus,
while the theory can help us understand why a certain behavior exists, it
cannot tell us whether such behavior should be tolerated or encouraged by
society or the law. Id. at 272-73. Moreover, the theory should not be used to
suggest that human beings have no ability to control their behaviors. Id. at
274-75.
264. Jones, supra note 263, at 277-80. For example, as Jones described,
evolutionary biology might predict that stepparents are more likely to kill
stepchildren than are biological parents. Such a prediction could influence child
welfare policy. Id.
265. See Owen D. Jones, Law and the Biology of Rape: Reflections on
Transitions, 11 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 151 (opining that because the law's
ability to prevent rape is a function of its behavioral model of rape, evolutionary
biology theory may be an effective model of the behavior, thereby aiding the law
in attempting to deter rape); see also Brian Kennan, Evolutionary Biology and
Strict Liability for Rape, 22 LAw & PSYCHOL. REV. 131 (1998) (proposing a new
approach to rape prosecution based on evolutionary biology, which would
replace the intent element of rape).
266. See Jones, supra note 247 (setting forth a comprehensive application of
evolutionary biology theory to child abuse).
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such as Professors E. Donald Elliott and William H. Rodgers, Jr.
have studied evolutionary biology in the context of environmental
law, their work, unlike what is being proposed in this Article, uses
the theory to predict human behavior and uses such predictions to
aid in the design of environmental regulation.2 67
In recent years, scholars have increasingly applied evolutionary
biology theory to a variety of "non-biological" entities. Richard
Dawkin's concept of the selfish gene led to the idea that entities
other than genes may also be able to evolve in accordance with
natural selection. 26 Dawkins coined the term "memes" to describe
entities other than DNA that may be subject to natural selection.269
The concept of evolutionary biology applying to non-biological
memes has led legal scholars to attempt to apply evolutionary

267. See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, The Tragi-Comedy of the Commons:
EvolutionaryBiology, Economic, and Environmental Law, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 17
(2001) (explaining that in the past two decades legal scholars have increasingly
looked at human nature from an evolutionary biology perspective to explain
legal phenomena). In this article, Elliott uses evolutionary biology theory to
explain the evolution of environmental law. For example, Elliott analogizes the
human-environmental relationship to a host-parasite relationship, wherein it is
to the advantage of the parasite to preserve its host and maintain a mutually
advantageous relationship. Id. at 20-25. Some environmental law scholars
have used evolutionary biology theory in a variety of other creative ways. For
example, Professor Rodgers has used the theory to analyze the human behavior
of deception as it occurred in a particular Atomic Energy Act case. William H.
Rodgers, Jr., Deception,.Self-Deception, and Mythology: The Law of Salmon in
the Pacific Northwest, 26 PAC. L.J. 821 (1995); see also Rodgers, supra note 249.
In this article, Professor Rodgers cites various evolutionary quirks as a
comparison to the human legal framework. The author notes how certain
species' current traits, such as a housecat's tail, which at one point served a
useful function, are a poor adaptations for an environment full of closing doors;
similarly, certain laws continue to "time-lag" in problematic fashion, and
remain on the books despite no longer serving society's needs. Id. at 52-53.
Rodgers argues for a better understanding of the inevitable influences that
evolutionary biology plays in the lawmaking norms of society, as laws, like
evolutionary biology, influence both history and human behavior. Id. at 56-57.
He concludes with a plea for a better understanding by those drafting laws to
not assume that "their decrees alone can suffice to bring about . . .[ailtruistic
behavior" and that like evolution, lawmaking can result in both adaptation and
maladaptation. Id. at 74-75.
268. DAWKINS, supra note 11. The idea is that any entity that can copy itself
is subject to natural selection, provided that the copies possess sufficient fidelity
to the original, that random mutation occasionally occurs, creating variability,
and that some of the random mutations confer a selective advantage in the
environment. Dawkins posits that whenever these conditions, which he calls
"Universal Darwinism," exist in the appropriate proportion, the process of
*natural selection necessarily will occur. Id. at 191-92, 322.
269. Id.
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biology theory to legal concepts such as copyright law. For example,
Professor Thomas F. Cotter has argued that principles of
evolutionary biology may help to illuminate important issues of
copyright law and policy.27 ° He describes how copyright affects the
way in which ideas and fragments of expression come into existence,
compete, and evolve.27 '
VII.
A.

AN EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY MODEL FOR REGULATING GMOS
General Considerations

Although the existing legal approaches to regulating GMOs, as
well as the refinements suggested by other scholars, adequately
address some of the risks associated with GMOs, to fully address
these complex issues a more dramatic and transformative approach
is warranted. The law must undergo a more dramatic and ongoing
evolution to keep pace with the dramatic changes that genetic
engineering has made, and has the potential to make, to the
evolution of life. This Article proposes that a completely new legal
approach drawing on principles of evolutionary biology is needed to
address the risk of novel environmental and economic harms caused
by human intervention in and manipulation of evolution. The new
approach would go well beyond traditional common law theory or
conventional regulatory approaches, both of which focus solely on
regulating human behavior and largely ignore the behavior of other
organisms.
Regulating human behavior cannot adequately address
environmental and economic risks created by human manipulation
of evolution. For example, traditional environmental standards may
limit the quantity of a substance that can be safely released into the
environment. However, the quantity of GMOs produced or released
into the environment may be irrelevant to GMOs because they are
able to reproduce and proliferate in the environment on their own.
Traditional environmental law focuses on imposing limitations on
where or how a substance can be used. For example, a regulation
may prohibit the use of a substance toxic to aquatic organisms
within X number of feet of a water body, may limit the time of year a
substance may be used to avoid wildlife migration events, or may
limit the geographic areas in which a substance may be used to
avoid exposure to protected species or sensitive ecosystems.
Moreover, under FIFRA in particular, use restrictions are
accomplished through language contained in the pesticide product

270. Thomas F. Cotter, Memes and Copyright, 80 TUL. L. REV. 331 (2005).
271. Id. at 351-54.
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label.272 The assumption embedded in the labeling approach is that
the only relevant conduct to be controlled is that of the human user
of the pesticide. Reliance on labeling instructions is misplaced when
addressing risks posed by living organisms capable of reproducing
and moving in the environment. When the behavior of the regulated
living organisms themselves is taken into account, the shortcomings
of such an approach, and the need for a new approach, become
apparent.
The new approach should reject regulation on the basis of the
product in favor of regulation based on the process used to create the
product.
Scientific understanding gleaned since the 1986
Coordinated Framework, in conjunction with public concern, has
demonstrated that ignoring the process by which the organism is
created is fraught with problems. Consistent with proposals of other
legal scholars, this Article proposes the adoption of a new federal
statute to comprehensively address all human health and
environmental risks potentially arising out of the 27introduction
of
3
GMOs into the environment and human food supply.

The most logical existing agency to have primary regulatory
authority under the new statute is EPA, which is the federal agency
with the most expertise in evaluating environmental and human
health risks associated with the release into the environment of
potentially harmful substances. 274 Due to the considerable scientific
uncertainty surrounding GMOs, any statute should adopt a
precautionary approach, requiring pre-market agency review with
the burden on the entity seeking authorization to provide reasonable
assurance that the requisite human health and environmental
criteria have been met. To provide such reasonable assurance,
submission of specified data should be required to enable the
reviewing agency to make an informed decision based on scientific
data as to whether the GMO should be permitted to be released into
the environment. 27 ' The type and amount of data required will vary

272. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
273. See Kunich, supra note 5, at 870-72; Mandel, supra note 243, at 224256; McGarity, supra note 67, at 489-509.
274. In addition, EPA already has SAP and BSAC, which have significant
expertise in and experience evaluating environmental and human health risks
associated with GMOs.
275. The term "reasonable assurances" is used in some of the state
environmental permitting statutes. Under such a statute, permit applicants
that seek certain authorizations have the burden of providing reasonable
assurances that the proposed activity will not have adverse effects on the
environment. Under Florida law, for example, reasonable assurances are not
synonymous with absolute guarantees. Hoffert v. St. Joe Paper Co., 12 F.A.L.R.
4972, 4987 (Dep't. Envtl. Regulation Dec. 6, 1990). The level of evidence the
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with the extent of the release and whether adequate physical or
biological containment can be ensured. For example, for limited
field testing, data demonstrating adequate containment may obviate
the need for the type and level of data necessary for full-scale
commercial release. The data requirements should reflect the best
scientific understanding of the types of risks identified in this
Article-i.e., traditional risks, novel risks, and economic risks.276
In evaluating data to determine whether to authorize release,
the reviewing agency should, cognizant of the uncertainties of
releasing living organisms into the environment and the lack of
ability to retrieve such organisms once they have reproduced and
spread in the environment, employ a binary approach whereby it is
recognized that once released, traditional risk minimization
mechanisms like labeling instructions may not be meaningful. Once
a decision is made to authorize release into the environment, the
reviewing agency should not abandon jurisdiction, as APHIS does
with its determination of nonregulated status, but instead should
retain regulatory jurisdiction over the GMO and require continued
monitoring and submission of adverse effects information as EPA
does under 40 C.F.R § 174.71. A new statutory provision should
authorize the relevant agency to bring enforcement actions seeking
administrative, civil, and criminal penalties, and should authorize
the destruction of crops and other GMO products if necessary to
prevent unacceptable human health or environmental risks.
This Article sets forth a proposed decisionmaking framework
that should be used to guide the reviewing agency's decisions on
whether to authorize the release of a GMO.
Under the
decisionmaking framework, EPA would ask specific questions to
evaluate each of the types of risks discussed in this Article. Most
significantly, with regard to all risk categories other than traditional
risks, the decisionmaking framework questions are based at least in
part on an evolutionary biology evaluation of the GMO. In other
words, the questions focus on the "mutation" and its effect on the
organism (e.g., whether the intentional mutation imparts some
selective advantage on the organism), the ability of the organism to
applicant must provide to demonstrate reasonable assurance is case-specific
depending on the nature of the issues involved. See Fla. Dept. of Transp. v. J.
W. C. Co., Inc., 396 So. 2d 778, 789 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). Moreover, the
reasonable assurance standard does not require an applicant to perform every
known test concerning an issue in order to establish entitlement to a permit.
Booker Creek Preserv., Inc. v. Mobil Chem. Co., 481 So. 2d 10, 13 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985). Rather, reasonable assurance means a "substantial likelihood" that
the project will be successfully implemented. Metro. Dade County v. Coscan
Fla., Inc., 609 So. 2d 644, 648 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
276. See supra Part III.

2007]

REGULATING EVOLUTION

reproduce and pass this trait on to its progeny (e.g., whether the
GMO can reproduce, whether it has a reproductive advantage or
disadvantage, whether terminator genes or sterility mechanisms are
imparted), and the environmental pressures to be asserted on the
GMO (e.g., will the GMO be released into an environment where it
will have a selective advantage).27 7 Consequently, any new federal
statute on GMOs should mandate an analysis that must be
conducted prior to the release of a pesticidal GMO into the
environment.
B.

Looking Before You Leap and the PrecautionaryPrinciple
Due to the ability of GMOs to spread and reproduce in the
environment, rather than attempting to "regulate" the GMOs, some
GMOs simply should not be permitted to be released into the
environment.
In other areas of environmental law, a binary
approach, or an "on-off' approach, to regulating environmental risks
may not be appropriate. A binary approach results in a high risk of
error, either by over-regulating low environmental risks when the
switch is off or under-regulating high environmental risks when the
switch is on. These risks are referred to as type 1 and type 2
scientific errors, respectively.
A more appropriate approach to regulating many environmental
risks, such as releases of chemicals pollutant into the environment,
may be through the use of a "rheostat switch," rather than an on/off
switch. Under the rheostat switch approach, the level of regulation
is adjusted depending on the level of risk presented. For GMOs
however, the rheostat approach may not be appropriate. GMOs are
living organisms that can spread and reproduce in the environment.
Once a GMO is released into the environment, there is no guarantee
that regulators will ever be able to gain control over the organism.
Accordingly, if an evolutionary biology advantage has been imposed
on a GMO enabling it to provide and reproduce readily in the
environment, a binary approach may be more appropriate. Under
this approach, the off switch would be employed to prevent the
release of such organisms into the environment whenever there are
potentially high risks. Such an approach would, by its nature,
277. It should be noted that while none of the existing regulatory programs
provide for a comprehensive step-by-step analysis of the various types of GMO
risk identified in this Article, the agencies do evaluate many of these risk, albeit
in a case-by-case, piecemeal fashion. For an example of the risk analysis that
EPA conducts in evaluating PIPs, see EPA, PUBL'N No. 730-F-05-002, BACILLUS
THURINGIENSIS CRY3BB1 PROTEIN AND THE GENETIC MATERIAL NECESSARY FOR ITS

PRODUCTION (VECTOR ZMIR13L) IN EVENT MON863 CORN (006484) FACT SHEET

(2005), http://epa.gov/pesticides/biopesticides/ingredients/factsheets/factsheet006484.htm (last visited Dec. 29, 2006).
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result in more type 1 errors by erring on the side of preventing the
release of organisms into the environment unless the risks are well
understood and determined to be acceptable.
Thus, a binary
approach employed in this way would be a precautionary approach
and would be similar to the approach asserted by proponents of the
precautionary principle.
The precautionary principle evolved in the context of
international efforts to protect biodiversity.278 The premise of the
principle is that where risks could be catastrophic or irreversible, we
should proceed cautiously. The Precautionary Principle, a principle
ratified in a number of international environmental agreements,
holds that where risks are potentially irreversible or catastrophic, a
lack of full
scientific understanding
should not stand in the way of
effots
o rducesuc
._279
efforts to reduce such risks.
It is not prudent to rush into
potentially risky behavior simply because you do not have 100%
scientific certainty that the behavior will not result in the feared
harm. Some have described this as the "look before you leap"
approach to environmental decisionmaking. 2
Perhaps the most serious concern with pesticidal GMOs stems
from the uncertainty of the risks of GMOs. Nowhere does the
Precautionary Principle appear to make more sense than with
GMOs, as harms arising from GMOs may truly be irreversible due
to GMOs'
ability
to spread and reproduce once released into the
•
281
environment.
Moreover, although the risk of GMO release
278. Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 143
[hereinafter Convention].
279. See, e.g., Treaty on European Union and Final Act, art. 130r(2), Feb. 7
1992, 31 I.L.M. 247, 285 (adopting the precautionary principle as a governing
principle of European Union Law); see also Convention, supra note 278, at 144.
The preamble to the Cartegena Protocol on Biosafety provides that it is
"[r]eaffirming the precautionary approach contained in.. . the Rio Declaration
on Environment and Development .

. . ."

Final Draft of Biosafety Protocol

Approved at Montreal Meeting on Biological Diversity Convention, 23 Int'l.
Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 125 (Jan. 29, 2000). Article 10(6) of the Protocol provides
that
[1]ack of scientific certainty due to insufficient relevant scientific
information and [knowledge] regarding the extent of potential adverse
effects of a living modified organism on the conservation and
sustainable use of biological diversity in the Party of import ... shall
not prevent that Party from taking a decision, as appropriate . . . in
order to avoid or minimize such potential adverse effects.
Id. at 127.
280. See NRC REPORT, supra note 221, at 64.
281. For further discussion on the need to apply the Precautionary Principle
to GMOs, see John S. Applegate, The Prometheus Principle: Using the
PrecautionaryPrinciple to Harmonize the Regulation of Genetically Modified
Organisms,9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 207 (2001).
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creating a new superweed or disrupting the balance of natural
ecosystems may be small, the consequences could be disastrous and
irreversible.2 2 The precise nature and magnitude of the risk is
difficult to predict because of the almost infinite variety of potential
GMOs, the ability of GMOs to reproduce and spread, the complexity
inherent in natural ecosystems, and the dearth of long-term data on
the effects of GMOs.8 2
C. Addressing TraditionalRisks, Novel Risks, Economic Risks,
and UncertainRisks: A DecisionmakingFramework
For traditional risk considerations that GMOs share with
conventional chemical substances, such as toxicity or other harm to
humans and non-target organisms, the current approaches to
determining type and extent of toxicity or other harm to humans
and other non-target organism can be employed. Data requirements
similar to those for conventional pesticides under FIFRA could be
utilized to determine toxicity. However, due to the ability of GMOs
to spread in the environment, exposure assessments will have to be
tailored to the GMO's biology. If a crop plant is genetically
engineered to produce a substance that is not toxic or allergenic
when ingested by humans, but is allergenic when inhaled, the
reviewing agency will have to consider inhalation routes of
exposure. For example, if the GM plant produces the allergenic
substance in its pollen, EPA will have to consider likely exposure of
humans to such pollen through inhalation. In addition, if the GM
plant is able to out-cross with wild relatives which will produce
pollen containing the allergen, even greater exposure could occur.
In evaluating whether a GMO passes the first step in the
framework related to traditional risk, the threshold question should
be whether the applicant has provided reasonable assurances that
the GMO is "safe" for humans. The statute should adopt the human
safety standard of FFDCA. As to fish and wildlife, a similar safety
standard could also apply, but with an "out" for GMOs that provide
overriding benefits to public health. For example, a GMO that
provides an overriding medical benefit may be allowed even if it is
not completely safe for some fish and wildlife.2 4
282. See Kunich, supra note 5, at 819.
283. See Celeste Marie Steen, FIFRA's Preemption of Common Law Tort
Actions Involving Genetically Engineered Pesticides, 38 ARIz. L. REV. 763, 764

(1996).
284. This approach is analogous to, but more protective than, the approach
taken in FIFRA, under which the standard for registering a pesticide is based
on a cost-benefit analysis, except in the case of public health pesticides, in
which the risks of the pesticide are weighed against the health risks, such as
the diseases transmitted by the vector to be controlled by the pesticide. See 7
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To obtain authorization to release the GMO into the
environment, the applicant must provide reasonable assurances
that the release will not pose adverse novel risks (e.g., an ability to
out-cross to wild relatives and potentially cause superweeds). EPA
should evaluate the probability that the GMO will be able to outcross to wild relatives and whether the wild relatives will be given a
selective advantage from the genetic modification. This involves a
consideration of a number of factors, including whether sexually
compatible relatives285 of the GMO exist in the area in which it is to
be released,286 the ability of the GMO to form viable hybrids with
wild or weedy relatives, whether the genetic modification imparts
traits that increases the fitness of the wild plant, and whether GMO
out-crossed wild plants will be likely to out-compete other plants in
the environment, thereby becoming weedy or invasive. For example,
if a plant is genetically engineered to be resistant to a certain viral
infection that normally kills a large percentage of a sexually
compatible weed's seedlings, significantly larger numbers of its
seedlings may flourish when the weed gains the ability to resist the
viral infection, thereby creating a superweed that can out-compete
other plants and whose population is no longer held in check by the
virus. If, on the other hand, the weed seedling population is not
ecologically limited by the virus, but instead is ecologically limited
by some other factor (such as the safe sites for germination), the
weed may not have a selective advantage imparted from its viral
resistance.287
Similarly, to obtain authorization for release, the applicant
should be required to provide reasonable assurances that the release
of the GMO will not cause adverse risks from the GMO itself
becoming more evolutionarily fit-i.e., the risks associated with the
GMO itself gaining a selective advantage that is akin to the
selective advantage held by invasive non-indigenous species. For
this type of risk, however, the presence or absence of wild relatives
is irrelevant. The risk assessment instead will focus on whether the
U.S.C. § 136(bb) (2000) (defining the term "unreasonable adverse effects on the
environment").
285. Some examples of crop plants with sexually compatible wild relatives in
the United States are barley, plants in the plum family, and watermelons. See
SAP REPORT, supra note 45, at 16.
286. SAP seems to believe that the relevant geographic area is the
continental United States. See id. at 18. But unless physical barriers exist to
prevent the spread to Canada and Mexico, the appropriate consideration may
be entire continent. Moreover, as can be seen from the StarLink debacle, once a
GMO is commercialized, it may be virtually impossible to prevent it from
entering other countries or continents, whether intentionally or inadvertently.
287. Id. at 21.

REGULATING EVOLUTION

20071

GMO, by virtue of the genetic engineering and/or its introduction
into a new environment, has become more "fit." For example, a crop
plant that has been bred to rely on the application of chemical
insecticides to limit insect pest damage may not be able to survive
on its own outside of cultivation with such chemical intervention. If,
however, the crop is genetically engineered to make it resistant to
the insect pest, it may be able to flourish on its own. Thus, EPA
would have to consider the likelihood that the crop itself could
become invasive due to the selective advantage imparted on it and
the likelihood that the GMO will be fit to compete in nature if it
escapes cultivation.
To obtain authorization to release the GMO into the
environment, the applicant must provide reasonable assurances
that the release will not cause adverse economic risks. The
economic risks posed by GMOs include the loss of ability to sell a
product as organic due to contamination with GMOs, the economic
costs of testing organic crops to determine whether such
contamination has taken place, and the risk of a GMO causing a
pest species to develop resistance to a particular biological pesticide.
The economic risks to organic farmers share many of the same
considerations as novel risks-i.e., the ability of the GMO to outcross. In the case of economic risk, however, the concern is not with
out-crossing to wild relatives, but out-crossing to organically grown
crops. For example, if pollen from GM corn fertilizes nearby organic
corn crops, the organic grower will not be able to sell her product as
organic. Moreover, with regard to this type of economic cost, the
concern is not with out-crossing to a species that will be more fit in
the environment. Any contamination of organic crops, whether
resulting in viable progeny or not, may be sufficient to cause
economic harms. Accordingly, careful evaluation of the GMO must
be done to ensure it does not have the ability to genetically
contaminate other crops.
With regard to the development of resistance to economically
important biological pesticides due to transgenic plants, the risk
considerations are somewhat different. Here, the concern is not
with the selective advantage imparted to the transgenic plant, but
rather with the evolution of the pest species that feeds on, or is
otherwise exposed to, the transgenic plant. To protect against such
an outcome, EPA typically requires applications for registration to
develop and implement an insect resistance management ("IRM")
These plans typically rely on the planting of refuges
plan.2 8
288. For examples of EPA's guidance for IRM plans for PIPs, see EPA, BT
COTTON

REFUGE

REQUIREMENTS

FOR

THE

2001

GROWING

SEASON

(2001),

http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/biopesticides/pips/btcotton-refuge-2001.htm
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surrounding transgenic crops that provide a location and food source
for insects that do not expose the insects to the transgenic plant, and
therefore, the pesticide, thereby allowing non-resistant insects to
survive and reproduce. To date, EPA's practice has been to approve
interim IRM plans or allow time for registrants to develop better
data and long-term IRM plans. 9 Nevertheless, even with the best
IRM plan, if a GMO is able to reproduce and spread in the
environment to the extent that it is no longer contained in controlled
crop fields that implement IRM, such plans are meaningless.
Accordingly, applicants seeking approval for GMOs that produce
existing pesticidal substances should be required to conduct an ex
ante analysis of the likelihood of the development or acceleration of
resistance based on the biology of the relevant pest species and the
likely quantity and distribution of the pesticide in the environment.
If the manufacturer cannot provide reasonable assurances that
any particular non-traditional risk (novel or economic) will not
occur, in order to obtain authorization to release the organism, the
manufacturer would have to demonstrate that it could genetically
manipulate the GMO not only to have the desired pesticidal trait
but also to prevent the nontraditional risk from occurring. In other
words, any evolutionary selective advantage that had been imparted
as a result of genetic engineering must be eliminated. This could be
achieved in a number of ways. For example, to prevent out-crossing
with a weedy relative or genetically contaminating other crops, the
GMO can be "biologically contained" by genetically engineering it to
have pollen of a shape or size that is physically incapable of crosspollinating other plants. To prevent the GMO from spreading
through reproduction, the plant could be engineered to contain a
"terminator" gene, which turns off the genetic modification after one
generation, or the GMO could be manipulated so that it is sterile
and can exist only for one generation. In addition, to address
concerns with the development of pest resistance, the manufacturer
of the GMO could develop resistance management plans that
require refugia to be established to enable "non-resistant" pests to
flourish. To address concerns with a lack of control over a GMO
once it is out in the environment, the GMO could be genetically
engineered to make it susceptible to a specific herbicide, so that
some level of control could be established were a problem to occur.
Just as there are any number of ways to genetically engineer
organisms to make them more evolutionarily "fit" for certain
(last visited Dec. 8, 2006); EPA, BT PLANT-INCORPORATED PROTECTANTS (2001),
http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/biopesticides/pips/bt brad2/4-irm.pdf (last visited
Dec. 8, 2006) [hereinafter PLANT-INCORPORATED PROTECTANTS].
289. See PLANT-INCORPORATED PROTECTANTS, supra note 288, at IID53-54.
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financial and societal purposes, there is no limit to ways to
genetically engineer organisms to make them less evolutionarily
"fit" to prevent human health, environmental, and economic harms.
Finally, it should be noted that although this Article proposes a
decisionmaking framework that ideally would be adopted in a new
federal statue designed to address all types of GMOs, until Congress
adopts such a comprehensive statute, the proposed framework could
be incorporated into the regulatory processes of EPA, FDA, and
USDA.
However, such a change would most likely require
amendments to the agencies' organic statutes to incorporate the
regulatory standards proposed in this Article.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Genetic engineering has accelerated and dramatically changed
the course of evolution to not only have potential economic and
societal benefits, but also to create completely novel and
unpredictable risks. Novel approaches that rely on principles of
evolutionary biology are needed to address these novel risks. In the
past, the United States has relied upon the existing patchwork of
statutes and regulations spread among several regulatory agencies
to regulate GMOs.
Not only has this approach resulted in
regulatory inconsistencies and interagency turf battles, but also it is
inherently skewed in that it does not take into consideration the
different types and degree of risk posed by GMOs. Evolutionary
biology theory can provide a framework for a new comprehensive
regulatory program to address the entire range of risks posed by
GMOs. The approach proposed in this Article addresses the full
array of risks and sets forth a clear regulatory standard and
decisionmaking framework to guide regulators in determining
whether or under what conditions to allow GMOs to be released into
the environment. Such an approach is necessary to ensure that the
potential risks of GMOs are adequately considered prior to allowing
the spread of such organisms in the environment. Now that humans
have added the Wright Brothers to the equation of biological
evolution through genetic engineering, it is time to put the Wright
Brothers into the equation of legal evolution.

